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regional and multilateral surveillance. The system has proved resilient during
the global economic crisis, but has serious flaws, which will be magnified by
the rapid transformation of the global economy. By 2020-30 economic power
is likely to be more evenly distributed than ever before between the US, the
euro area and China.
This report assesses the implications for the international monetary system
of this ongoing shift. It discusses what factors enable a currency to play an
international role, and concludes that neither the euro nor the renminbi are
likely soon to be in a position to challenge the dollar’s supremacy. However,
they will play an increasingly meaningful international role. The euro area, pro-
vided that it implements governance reform, could benefit from a move away
from today’s dollar-denominated system.
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Foreword
The reform of the international monetary system (IMS) is a speculative and complex
issue on which decision makers have widely diverging views. Reform discussions
were revived by the 2007-09 global crisis. Although the IMS’s direct responsibility for
the crisis is a controversial question for academics and practitioners, there is little
doubt that some of its features, such as exchange-rate inﬂexibility, limited trust in
multilateral liquidity-provision schemes and subsequent self-insurance through
reserve accumulation, or the lack of external adjustment mechanisms, helped create
the macroeconomic environment in which excessive leverage and risk-taking took
place. Nor is there is much doubt that, in the aftermath of the crisis, these same
features are an obstacle to a return to sustained and balanced growth in the global
economy.
The reform of the IMS was selected as a priority by the French presidency of the G20
in 2011. France, however, has been cautious not to propose a grand reform plan. Rather,
it has taken issues one by one and has sought to reach consensus on each individual
dossier. At the time of completing this report, discussions at the G20 were evolving
around three main topics: (i) the completion of efforts undertaken by the 2010 Korean
G20 presidency to strengthen multilateral schemes for liquidity provision in times of
crisis; (ii) the strengthening of multilateral surveillance and the search for consensus
on the desirable use of capital controls, and (iii) preparations for a change in the
composition of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket. 
The piecemeal approach is politically astute but analytically perplexing, as it does not
help to ﬁgure out what the big picture could look like. Indeed, efforts to revamp the
system should be considered as small steps in what is bound to be a long march. We
believe that the current small steps should be assessed in the light of a longer-term
perspective and this is what we are trying to do in this report. Our focus is on where this
march could lead to by 2025.
In our view, the most probable scenario is multipolar: in addition to the US dollar, one
or several key international currencies will emerge. For this role, the euro and the
x
renminbi are prime candidates, but we cannot exclude that only one of these
currencies achieves international currency status – nor that other currencies emerge,
though over signiﬁcantly longer term. 
Such an evolution of the IMS would be positive to the extent that it would imply free
capital mobility and exchange-rate ﬂexibility between the different poles, as well as,
in each region concerned, the development of a liquid market for benchmark bonds.
However, genuine multipolarity would also require that each of the monetary poles
stands ready to fulﬁl international duties in quiet times as well as in times of crisis.
Such preconditions are clearly not met currently by the main economic and currency
blocs, albeit for different reasons. China has already taken signiﬁcant but incomplete
steps in the direction of internationalisation. The euro area is under stress but it could
possibly emerge stronger from its current crisis. The United States, meanwhile, is far
from willing to accept full responsibility for the international repercussions of its
macroeconomic actions. Nevertheless, several factors detailed in this report suggest
that the prospect of a multipolar IMS is more realistic than often assumed. 
If the IMS is in fact moving towards multipolarity in the medium run, the role of
international coordination is to accompany this market-based movement in order to
reap the full beneﬁts and counter the risks. The discussions surrounding the enlarge -
ment of the SDR basket (through the inclusion of the renminbi) and the coordination
of bilateral swap arrangements can be understood in this context.
Does this exclude a complete overhaul of the multilateral system organised around a
quasi-global currency and centralised management of global liquidity? In the short
run, it should be recognised that the conditions for this scenario to materialise are not
met, not least because no large country is ready to deviate from domestic priorities.
However, such a scenario might be raised again, for instance in the event of another
global crisis. We therefore keep the multilateral scenario as one possible outcome,
though not the most likely, and investigate its implications for the euro area. 
For reasons of history and experience, Europe tends to favour cooperative solutions,
and indeed the multilateral scenario would probably be the best for Europeans. As this
is unlikely to materialise, the EU might have to decide if it wants to back a multi -
polarisation of the IMS. Further internationalisation of the euro would involve beneﬁts,
but also major policy changes (such as the introduction of safe euro-area-wide assets)
and responsibilities (such as the willingness to extend generous swap lines in case of
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a liquidity crisis). The euro area may or may not be prepared to envisage such a
transformation, but it would be well advised to consider it seriously and to make a
conscious choice, rather than be driven to decisions by outside events.
This report was prepared at the request of the European Commission by a joint research
team from Bruegel and the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Inter -
nationales (CEPII). 
Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, director of CEPII
Jean Pisani-Ferry, director of Bruegel
July 2011
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Executive summary
This report examines how the international monetary system (IMS) might evolve and
the implications of different scenarios for the euro area over the next ﬁfteen years.
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system forty years ago, the IMS gradually
developed into its present state, a hybrid mix of exchange-rate ﬂexibility, capital
mobility and monetary independence. The US dollar retains a dominant, but not
exclusive, role and the IMS governance system blends regional and multilateral
surveillance. It combines IMF-based and ad-hoc liquidity provision. Although it has
proved resilient during the crisis, partly thanks to ad-hoc arrangements, the IMS has
serious ﬂaws, which are likely to be magniﬁed by the rapid transformation of the global
economy and the increasing economic power of emerging economies. 
This report begins by taking stock of two major historical lessons:
• Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the emphasis in most countries has
shifted towards internal rather than external stability. This priority is likely to remain
pivotal in the coming decades.
• Although the dollar has been dominant for several decades, having succeeded
sterling, history demonstrates that multipolar systems based on more than one key
currency can exist, and can also persist for several decades.
This report assesses the implications for the IMS of the ongoing shift in the world
balance of economic power. By 2020-2030 economic power is likely to be more evenly
distributed among key players – the US, the euro area and China – than at any point
in time in recent history. This report discusses what factors enable a currency to play
an international role, and concludes that neither the euro nor the renminbi are likely to
be in a position to challenge the supremacy of the dollar. However, they are likely to
come to play a meaningful international role, provided certain conditions are met.
The report then outlines three possible scenarios for the IMS:
1
• A repair-and-improve scenario in which changes to current arrangements are
introduced through incremental reforms.
• A multipolar scenario in which a system structured around two or three international
currencies emerges.
• A multilateral scenario in which participants agree to take steps towards a
strengthened international monetary order.
The ﬁrst scenario is the least demanding in terms of both domestic policies and
international coordination and the most likely to prevail in the short term, while the
third is the most demanding and therefore the least likely of the three scenarios.
Though limited in ambition, the ﬁrst scenario would be an important stepping-stone
towards further development of the IMS. The second scenario relies on market forces
and domestic policies rather than on international cooperation and the probability of
it emerging, although fairly low in the short run, becomes higher within a 10-15 year
horizon. The probability of the third scenario emerging is low, but can gain likelihood in
case of major international ﬁnancial crises.
Assessment of the three scenarios on the basis of eﬃciency, stability and equity
suggests that:
• All three would offer improvements compared to the current system.
• Their feasibility negatively correlates to their desirability.
• The multipolar scenario would best correspond to structural changes in the world
economy and mitigate some (though not all) of the ﬂaws of the current IMS.
The deeper transformation of the IMS is likely to take a long time. The report analyses
three speciﬁc issues for the transition and concludes that:
• The renminbi can attain a moderate international role without major changes to
Chinese policies, but deeper reforms will be needed to rival the euro and the dollar.
• In the absence of a major overhaul of the IMS, the ‘repair-and-improve‘ scenario
(which includes lower incentives to accumulate reserves), together with signiﬁcant
domestic policy shifts, can be powerful in reducing global imbalances. 
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• Concerning exchange-rate misalignments and asymmetries in the run-up to the
multipolar and multilateral scenarios, (i) Chinese developments are not neutral for
the euro/dollar exchange rate if China keeps a ﬁxed exchange rate to the dollar, (ii)
moving from a dollar-centred to a multi-currency system and more ﬂexibility of the
renminbi exchange rate could create more short-term exchange-rate volatility, but
reduce the potential for medium-term exchange-rate misalignments, (iii) the
internationalisation of the renminbi would be stabilising for the euro/dollar exchange
rate.
From the point of view of the euro area:
• The multilateral scenario not only stands out as the most desirable, but is also
particularly congruent with the euro area’s intrinsic principles.
• The multipolar scenario would be preferable to the repair-and-improve scenario.
• In comparison to the current dollar-dominated system, the euro area could beneﬁt
from a move to a bipolar system around the dollar and the renminbi.
• The capacity of the euro to increase its international status requires major decisions
by the euro area, such as further governance reform, the creation of a Eurobond
market, and the streamlining of external representation.
• Issuing a fully-ﬂedged international currency involves both privileges and duties;
increasing the euro’s role is a political choice. 
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41 Introduction
After three decades of apathy, the debate on the international monetary system
(hereafter IMS) is back. In the 1960s and 1970s, discussions raged about international
liquidity provision, the pros and cons of abandoning the gold exchange standard, and
the initial diﬃculties of the free-ﬂoating regime. In the 1980s, interest had already
shrunk to correcting large and persistent exchange-rate misalignments between key
currencies. In the 1990s discussions about reforming the IMS virtually disappeared
from the international agenda. The focus shifted to more speciﬁc issues such as the
choice of exchange-rate regimes for emerging and developing countries, the manage -
ment and resolution of balance-of-payment and ﬁnancial crises, and the set-up of
regional exchange arrangements, like the euro or the Chiang Mai initiative. Even among
scholars, the topic of the international monetary system lost appeal, gradually moving
to the realm of economic history. The predominant view was that a market-driven
combination of (managed) ﬂoating exchange rates, dollar dominance and a lack of a
formal global price anchor was the only viable arrangement in a world where internal
objectives, such as full employment and price stability, had superseded external ones
on a permanent basis. 
Four recent developments have led to a revival of the discussion on reforming the IMS:
• One is the rise of global imbalances and their role in the global crisis. A widespread
though far from unanimous opinion among academics (see for example Eichen -
green, 2009b; Portes, 2009) and policymakers (see Larosière, 2009; Turner, 2009,
and King, 2010) is that the interplay between macro-imbalances and ﬁnancial
market developments and innovation was an essential ingredient in the genesis of
the crisis. There is also broad (but again not unanimous) recognition that macro-
imbalances were facilitated by the lack of incentives for policy adjustment and the
weakness of multilateral disciplines. Hence, discussion about the prevention of
future crises put IMS reform back on the agenda. 
• Second, dissatisfaction with capital flow volatility has revived the debate about the
costs and benefits of free capital mobility. The general consensus established in the
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1990s about the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial globalisation has been undermined, not only
because of the crisis but also, and more simply, because many emerging countries
have been repeatedly overwhelmed by surges of capital inﬂows followed by sudden
outﬂows. Also, a large set of countries (China, India and a number of emerging
economies) have demonstrated that they could perform economically while
retaining tight capital controls. 
• Third, the accumulation of very large international reserves by still relatively poor
countries raises concerns about the welfare cost of holding reserves and capital
allocation at global level. Foreign-exchange reserves are mostly invested in high-
quality and low-yielding liquid assets. Such an investment strategy has welfare
costs for countries that accumulate reserves and it has implications for international
capital ﬂows that are undesirable from an allocative viewpoint. Moreover, there is a
growing fear among large oﬃcial reserves holders that the present system exposes
them to the risk of large capital losses, should the dollar depreciate in a disorderly
way. In brief, foreign-exchange reserves seem to offer an unfavourable risk-return
trade-off. Increasing concerns in the developing and emerging world were vividly
exposed in a post widely commented on, by China’s central bank governor in March
2009 (Zhou, 2009), in which he unexpectedly called for a reform of the IMS based
on a revival of Special Drawing Rights (SDR). 
• Fourth, disputes over the pegging strategies of emerging countries, and monetary
policies in advanced countries, emphasise the increasingly evident need for an
emancipation of monetary policies in large emerging countries. The process started
before the crisis with the adoption of inﬂation-targeting monetary policy strategies
by many emerging economies. However, fear of ﬂoating and collective-action
problems led many other countries to stick with the objective of a stable exchange
rate and to sterilise the monetary consequences of increased net capital inﬂows. In
the wake of the crisis, the large growth differential between the ‘North’ and the
‘South’ has made such a double-target model unworkable without raising barriers to
capital ﬂows. These developments have prompted fears of ‘currency wars’.
The common theme running through these developments is the recognition that current
international monetary arrangements seem incapable of delivering not only domestic
internal and external stability for each individual country, but also global economic and
ﬁnancial stability. Whether such a recognition – well articulated by the report of the
Palais-Royal initiative (Camdessus et al, 2011) – and the ensuing discussions will lead
to reform action soon, or calls for reform will lose strength in the face of the formidable
negotiating diﬃculties that any reform of international monetary relations entails, is
1. The Smithsonian Agreement of 1971, which simply took note of the unilateral decision by the US Government to
end the Bretton Woods system, is hardly an exception.
diﬃcult to predict. Sceptics point out that agreements on overhauls of the IMS were only
reached in exceptional circumstances, typically following major wars1.
In this report, we argue that, even though (i) its role in the genesis of the global 2007-
09 crisis remains controversial, and (ii) it proved resilient during the crisis, the IMS is
ill suited to accompany the accelerated transformation of the global economy and the
rising economic power of emerging economies. Existing ﬂaws are likely to become
more acute while the global economy because multipolar. Sooner or later, the IMS will
have to evolve through market developments if not through policy initiatives. 
Throughout the report, we consider a broad deﬁnition of an IMS: a set of practices, rules
and institutions governing international payments, the choice of exchange regimes
and the supply, holding and use of international reserves. A well-functioning IMS is
expected to facilitate international trade and promote an eﬃcient cross-border
allocation of capital by fostering a modicum of monetary stability at national level and
in foreign-exchange markets; by preventing or eliminating distortions and excessive
external imbalances; and by ensuring an adequate provision of international liquidity,
in normal as well as in crisis times. This is a tall order and a major reason for long-
standing controversies on reforming the IMS. 
The current IMS can be viewed as intermediate between the Bretton Woods system,
which was abandoned in 1973, and a pure ﬂoating exchange-rate regime with
unfettered capital mobility, market-determined exchange rates, independent national
monetary policies, and multilateral provisions for surveillance and crisis management.
The present system differs from the ‘pure’ system in three respects. First, not all
currencies ﬂoat freely, capital mobility is not perfect everywhere and monetary
independence is accordingly limited in some countries. Second, the multilateral
system of crisis management is not fully reliable, or at least it is not considered to be
by many emerging countries, which triggers spectacular reserve accumulation in order
to self-insure against major shocks. Finally, the dollar has retained a central role in this
system whereas it was expected to evolve towards more symmetry after the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system.
Starting from this hybrid system, we review three scenarios for the IMS and assess
their implications from various perspectives, including for the EU economy. The three
scenarios are:
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1. A repair-and-improve scenario whereby changes to current arrangements are
introduced through incremental reforms. These are inter alia enhanced surveillance,
a voluntary reform of exchange-rate arrangements, especially in Asia; improved
international liquidity facilities; accompanying domestic reforms such as the
development of home-currency ﬁnancial markets; and regional initiatives to
complement current IMF facilities. Under this scenario, the international role of key
currencies remains broadly constant and the US dollar retains its dominant role,
the euro’s role remains broadly unchanged, and the renminbi’s expands, but
remains marginal in comparison to the dollar and the euro.
2. A multipolar scenario in which a system structured around two or three international
currencies – presumably the dollar, the euro and the renminbi – emerges over a
10-15 year horizon. Although a move to a multipolar system is generally viewed as
a remote prospect, especially in the case of the renminbi, it corresponds to the long-
run evolution of the world economy. The Chinese authorities have taken signiﬁcant
steps in this direction through various schemes and their currency has a strong
potential for internationalisation. As for the euro, it has already developed as a
diversiﬁcation currency and in this scenario the euro area overcomes its current
diﬃculties and graduates from a mainly regional to a truly global currency. Yet we
also examine an alternative bipolar scenario with the dollar and the renminbi, which
may occur if the euro remains handicapped.
3. A multilateral scenario in which participants agree to take steps towards a
strengthened international monetary order. In contrast with the multipolar scenario,
which will largely rely on market forces and national policies, renewed multi -
lateralism would require a fairly intense degree of international coordination and
the development of new instruments to help escape the pitfalls of regimes based
on the dominant role of one or a few national currencies, foster macro economic
discipline and provide for international liquidity management. A system of this sort
could build on the existing SDR or rely on other, new vehicles. 
While recognising the potential merits of a truly multilateral monetary order, we doubt
it could materialise in the foreseeable future and therefore conclude that, within a 10-
15 year horizon, the probability of the multipolar scenario is relatively high and that this
scenario could contribute to mitigating some (though not all) ﬂaws of the present IMS.
The transition to a multipolar system however entails some speciﬁc risks, such as an
abrupt reserve diversiﬁcation, which would require tighter coordination during the
transition. 
2. Bénassy-Quéré and Pisani-Ferry (2011) analyse the potential for exchange-rate volatility in different monetary
systems concerning exchange-rate regimes and currency internationalisation. They use a portfolio-choice model,
and analyse the United States, the euro area and China. Bénassy-Quéré, Carton and Gauvin (2011a) explore the
contribution to be expected from an IMS reform to the reduction of global imbalances by studying various structural
reforms in China (pension reform, ﬁnancial reform, public spending) under alternative assumptions about the
Chinese monetary regime. They build a micro-founded macroeconomic model with overlapping generations,
nominal rigidities and ﬁnancial constraints. Bénassy-Quéré, Carton and Gauvin (2011b) use the same model to
study policy spillovers from the United States to other countries. Vallée (2011) studies the various steps taken by
the Chinese authorities to internationalise the renminbi while maintaining relatively strict capital controls and the
inﬂexibility of the exchange rate. After presenting novel data and an assessment of the measures taken so far, the
paper proposes a roadmap for renminbi internationalisation. Destais and Zdzienicka (2011) discusses the
identiﬁcation, measurement and management of liquidity and their connection to the international monetary
system.
We believe the euro has the capacity to increase its international status, provided key
decisions are taken by the euro area, such as further governance reform, the creation
of a Eurobond market, and the streamlining of euro-area external representation.
However, issuing a fully-ﬂedged international currency involves both privileges and
duties, including the duty to play the role of a global lender of last resort in times of
crisis. Should the euro area not be ready to play this role, we argue that the IMS as a
whole, and Europe also, would already beneﬁt from a move to a bipolar system around
the dollar and the renminbi. Finally, we argue that the ﬁrst scenario, which is less far-
reaching than the other two, would be a key stepping-stone to further development of
the IMS, especially since it would facilitate the reduction of global imbalances during
the transition towards more radical changes in the IMS.
Of course, these views are highly speculative. In particular, although signiﬁcant steps
have been taken by the Chinese authorities in this direction, the road will still be long
before the renminbi can play a similar role to the dollar. Due to domestic constraints or
international disruptions, the renminbi may not become a fully ﬂedged international
currency within a 10-15 year horizon. Symmetrically, the appetite of governments for
multilateral solutions, which is today relatively low, may abruptly decline should a dollar
crisis occur. Therefore, we believe the ‘repair-and-improve’ scenario to be a ‘no-regret’
option, since it would improve the functioning of the present system while paving the
way for an evolution towards either the multipolar or the multilateral scenario.
This report, which presents our main analysis and conclusions, is partly based on ﬁve
background papers that present novel lines of investigation: Bénassy-Quéré and
Pisani-Ferry (2011); Bénassy-Quéré, Carton and Gauvin (2011a and 2011b); Vallée
(2011); and Destais and Zdzienicka (2011)2. Results from these ﬁve papers are
summarised and taken into account in the remainder of this report. 
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The report is structured as follows. In section 2 we ﬁrst review the lessons from history
up to the late 1990s. In section 3 we analyse the current regime and assess its role in
the crisis as well as its implications for the adjustment of global imbalances and
international liquidity provision. This is followed in section 4 by a review of the global
trends that are going to affect the balance of economic power and its monetary
consequences. Section 5 presents the assessment of alternative international
monetary regimes using four main criteria: eﬃciency, stability, equity and feasibility.
Section 6 discusses issues related to the transition from the current system and
section 7 assesses the implications for the euro area. Finally, section 8 concludes.
3. See, in particular, Bordo (1993), Eichengreen (2008) and Krugman and Obstfeld (2008).
2 Lessons from history
Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the IMS has been through four phases: the
gold standard that prevailed until the start of the ﬁrst world war; the interwar period; the
post second world war Bretton Woods system that ended in 1971; and the current
dollar-based system that started in 1973 with the advent of generalised ﬂoating. We
brieﬂy review these four phases up to the late 1990s and examine their performance
in terms of internal and external balances3.
2.1 The gold standard period (1870-1914)
The gold standard originated in 1819, when the United Kingdom oﬃcially adopted gold
as the basis for its currency. Other countries in Europe, but also Japan and the United
States, adopted the gold standard later in the century. Given the pre-eminence of the
United Kingdom in world trade and ﬁnance, London was the centre of the IMS built on
the gold standard.
Under the gold standard, the main objective of the central bank was to preserve the
oﬃcial parity between its currency and gold. Maintenance of a ﬁxed price of gold by all
participants in the system in turn ensured ﬁxed exchange rates between their
currencies. The maintenance of gold convertibility at the oﬃcial parity required
suﬃcient gold reserves. External balance did not, therefore, consist of attaining a
current account target but rather of maintaining the balance of payments (BOP) in
equilibrium – or at least limiting sharp ﬂuctuations in the balance of payments – in
order to avoid large gold reserve movements. 
The gold standard included both an automatic adjustment mechanism (known as the
‘price-specie-ﬂow mechanism’) and an agreement between central banks to buy or
sell domestic assets depending on whether their country’s BOP was in surplus or in
deﬁcit (known as the gold standard ‘rules of the game’) that contributed to the
simultaneous attainment of external equilibrium in all participating countries. 
10
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The gold standard was very much the product of the nineteenth century economic
order. It was run by a small group of central bankers in a handful of countries (mainly
the UK, France and the US), who gave precedence to the achievement of external
balance at the expense of internal balance. Full employment was nowhere an explicit
objective of policymakers and, though price stability was generally attained, it was
not a natural outcome of the system because changes in the supply of gold, exogenous
and unpredictable, inevitably affected the relative prices of gold vis-à-vis other
commodities. Such disregard for internal balance on the part of the gold standard later
prompted Keynes to refer to gold as ‘barbarous’.
2.2 The interwar period (1918-1939)
Governments largely freed themselves of the gold standard’s constraints during the
ﬁrst world war in order to print the money necessary to ﬁnance the war effort. As a
result, money supplies and price levels were signiﬁcantly higher in 1918 than at the
start of the war. 
The interwar period saw three regimes: general ﬂoating from 1919 to 1925; the gold
exchange standard from 1926 to 1931; and managed ﬂoating from 1932 to 1939.
The US returned to gold in 1919, but other countries, including the UK, continued to
let their currencies ﬂoat freely for several years after the war. After 1925, when the UK
returned to the gold standard by pegging sterling to gold at its pre-war parity, the IMS
evolved into a gold exchange standard, a variant of the pre-war system. The new ﬁxed
exchange-rate system added a new category of international reserves to gold,
currencies fully backed by gold, mainly sterling and the dollar, in the hope of avoiding
the problem of gold shortage that had at times plagued the gold standard. 
The gold exchange standard was an attempt to restore the beneficial features of
the classical gold standard in terms of external objectives, while also seeking to
fulfil internal objectives, which had become much more prominent in the new socio-
political environment that prevailed after the first world war in many countries.
However the system suffered from a number of flaws that led to its eventual
demise. The main shortcomings were the failure of cooperation between the main
countries – the coordination mechanisms were either absent or highly
dysfunctional – and the unwillingness of the countries with large balance-of-
payment surpluses to follow the ‘rules of the game’, with the consequence that
deflationary pressure was exerted on the rest of the world. The use of two reserve
currencies and the absence of leadership by a hegemonic power may have also
4. See Bordo (1993).
played a role4. In the end, the system sought to achieve political goals (in dealing
with German reparations) and both internal and external equilibria, but succeeded
in achieving neither.
The collapse of the gold exchange system after the UK left gold in 1931 – with the US
following suit a couple of years later – ushered in a period of managed ﬂoating
exchange rates and beggar-thy-neighbour devaluations. In 1933, the London World
Economic Conference attempted to implement international coordination of macro -
economic policies with a view to ending the Great Depression, but it failed miserably
and international economic disintegration continued unabated. 
2.3 The Bretton Woods period (1945-1971)
The Bretton Woods system was set up to avoid the ﬂaws of the classical gold standard
and of the interwar period, and to promote full employment and price stability while
permitting countries to reach external balance without trade restrictions.
The system agreed at the Bretton Woods conference in July 1944 was a gold exchange
standard, but with the dollar as the main reserve currency, a mechanism for inter -
national macroeconomic policy coordination, and with at the centre the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The value of the dollar was ﬁxed to gold at $35 per ounce of gold,
and all other currencies maintained ﬁxed exchange rates against the dollar. Fixed
exchange rates were considered necessary to achieve both monetary discipline and
external equilibrium, as under the gold standard, but also to avoid competitive
devaluations and protectionism as in the 1930s. However, the architects of the system
recognised that countries would not be ready to sacriﬁce the objective of full
employment to maintain external equilibrium and free trade, and therefore that
external adjustment may be needed at times. Ensuring the necessary adjustment was
the responsibility of the IMF, which could lend to countries in need and authorise
changes in their exchange rate against the dollar if it found that their balance of
payments was in ‘fundamental disequilibrium’. Hence, Bretton Woods was an adjust -
able peg system combining the favourable features of the ﬁxed exchange-rate system,
monetary and exchange-rate stability, with those of ﬂexible rates, monetary and ﬁscal
independence. 
The Bretton Woods system went through two sub-periods: before the restoration of
currency convertibility in Europe and elsewhere (1946-1958), and after (1959-1971).
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In 1946, almost every country, except the US, maintained exchange controls and
controls on trade, with no major currency, except the dollar, convertible. In addition, the
US held about two thirds of the world’s monetary gold. The result was twofold. First, the
dollar became the world’s key currency, a universal medium of exchange, unit of
account and store of value. Second, there was initially a huge shortage of dollars,
especially in Europe where production and export capacity had been destroyed by
the war and ﬁnancial markets had limited capacity to ﬁnance the rebuilding of Europe,
which limited the ability of European countries to ﬁnance imports. The key
developments in solving the dollar shortage problem were the Marshall Plan and the
European Payments Union (EPU). The Marshall Plan involved huge transfers of
resources from the US to Europe. The EPU was a system of clearing accounts, using
the dollar as unit of account, among European countries that allowed them to reduce
their need for dollars for transaction purposes, to move from bilateral to multilateral
trade arrangements and to restore the convertibility of their currencies by the end of
1958. 
With the restoration of current-account convertibility in Europe, the Bretton Woods
system moved into full operation, but instead of functioning as an adjustable peg
system it evolved into a quasi ﬁxed exchange-rate system. The reason for this
evolution was that monetary authorities were reluctant to accept the risks associated
with discrete changes in parities, in particular the pressure of speculative capital ﬂows
that increased gradually over time as capital controls were relaxed. In the late 1960s,
however, balance-of-payment crises became increasingly frequent and several
countries had to change their dollar parities to move closer to internal and external
balance. 
Because of its special role in the system, the external balance problem of the US was
different from that of other countries. As the issuer of the reserve currency, the US was
not responsible for pegging dollar exchange rates. Its duty was to keep the value of
the dollar ﬁxed at its gold parity and to guarantee that foreign central banks could
convert their dollar reserves into gold at this parity, which in principle imposed a
constraint on US monetary policy. 
Triﬃn (1960), however, pointed out that foreign central banks were willing to
accumulate dollars and therefore to allow persistent US balance-of-payments deﬁcits.
The reason was that, barring new gold discoveries, the only way for central banks to
maintain adequate international reserves and domestic price levels was to accumulate
dollar assets, which also have the advantage over gold that they pay interest. This
meant that, in practice, the external constraint on US monetary policy was less than for
other countries. Triﬃn understood that this situation posed a fundamental problem for
the Bretton Woods system and formulated what would later become known as Triﬃn’s
dilemma. On the one hand central banks welcomed persistent US deﬁcits so that they
could avoid deﬂation; on the other hand such deﬁcits created a conﬁdence problem
because central banks realised that their growing holdings of dollars might eventually
exceed US gold reserves. Knowing that the US authorities might be unable to redeem
these dollars at the agreed parity, central bankers could become reluctant to continue
to accumulate dollars, which would call into question the whole system. 
The creation of the SDR by the IMF in 1969 was meant to be a solution to Triﬃn’s
dilemma by introducing a ﬁat reserve asset which was not linked to one country.
However, it was too little, too late to save the Bretton Woods system. By that time, US
macroeconomic policy had become inappropriate for a key currency, as a result of the
expansionary effect exercised by the simultaneous ﬁnancing of the Vietnam war and
the increase in spending on social programmes by the Johnson administration (the so-
called ‘Great Society’). While the Federal Reserve failed to foresee the build-up of
inﬂationary potential, rising US inﬂation after 1965 triggered a speculative attack on
the world’s monetary gold stock in 1968, which led to the creation of a two-tier gold
market, one private and the other oﬃcial. The oﬃcial price of gold remained at $35 an
ounce for a while, but it had lost economic signiﬁcance. The Bretton Woods system
collapsed three years later, in 1971, when the US ended the link between the dollar
and gold. After two turbulent years on foreign-exchange markets marked by exchange-
rate realignments and speculation, ﬁxed exchange rates among the dollar, the yen and
the currencies of most European and other industrial countries were replaced by
ﬂoating rates. 
2.4 Post-Bretton Woods (1971-late 1990s)
Here we only consider the period until the late 1990s, while subsequent developments
will be examined in section 3.
For a while, the system of ﬂoating exchange rates put in place during the mid-1970s
seemed well suited to achieving policymakers’ goals of full employment, stable prices
and sustainable current-account positions. Gradually, however, this hope dissipated,
notably because the key players’ macroeconomic policies were often not consistent
with international monetary stability, and foreign-exchange markets have a tendency
to overshoot before adjusting to equilibrium.
Major problems emerged ﬁrst in the early 1980s, when the monetary policy conducted
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by Federal Reserve chairman Volcker led to a sharp appreciation of the dollar against
the Japanese yen and the German mark, which was accompanied by a serious
recession and a large current-account deﬁcit for the US economy. This led to the Plaza
Accord of September 1985 by the then G5 nations (France, Japan, the United Kingdom,
the United States and West Germany). The G5 agreed to devalue the US dollar in relation
to the Japanese yen and German mark by intervening in currency markets. The
depreciation of the US dollar led to the Louvre Accord of February 1987 when the G6
(Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany)
agreed to stabilise the international currency markets and halt the appreciation of the
yen and the mark caused by the Plaza Accord.
Although the Plaza and the Louvre Accords are generally credited for having (tem -
porarily) ended volatility and misalignment of the US dollar, the period between the
two agreements is often regarded, not only in Japan but also in China, as the
beginning of Japan’s lost decade. During this period, the yen appreciated sharply
against the dollar, causing a recession and importing disinﬂation into Japan.
Japanese policymakers reacted by expanding both ﬁscal and monetary policies.
These policy actions reversed the economic situation but contributed to creating an
asset price bubble in the late 1980s, with sharp rises in stock, real estate and other
asset prices. 
Hence, although viewed as successful by US advocates of exchange-rate manage -
ment, with some even calling for the establishment of target zones defended by
interest-rate policies and intervention (Bergsten, 1988), the Plaza episode is generally
regarded with suspicion by others, including nearly all Asian economists (see
McKinnon and Ohno, 1997; Hamada and Okada, 2009).
2.5 Two key lessons from history
Our survey of the history of the IMS leads to two key conclusions that are important for
thinking about the present and future system.
First, there has been a clear shift of emphasis on the part of domestic policymakers
from external to internal stability, which seems diﬃcult to reverse given the evolution
of political systems and the preferences of national electorates. The Bretton Woods
system was a brave attempt to correct the excesses of the past and to seek a balance
between external stability, which prevailed during the gold standard period, and
internal stability, which dominated the minds of domestic policymakers during the ill-
fated interwar period. 
5 . See Eichengreen (2005) and Eichengreen and Flandreau (2009).
Unfortunately, the perception of a balance achieved during the Bretton Woods era was
short-lived, mainly because of ﬂaws in the design of the system which gave an
‘exorbitant privilege’ to the dominant country, the United States, and its currency, the
US dollar. Once a serious conﬂict between internal and external stability emerged, the
US government chose the former and the system collapsed, paving the way for the
non-system that has existed since 1971, which has largely ignored external stability,
apart from exceptional circumstances in the 1980s. 
The second conclusion concerns the role of currencies as foreign-exchange reserves.
During the gold standard, gold was the dominant reserve asset but countries had an
incentive to keep some of their reserves in interest-bearing assets denominated in
foreign currencies that were convertible to gold. In theory many currencies fulﬁlled
this need since they were all convertible to gold. In practice, however, the most popular
currency was the British pound because of the size and liquidity of sterling-
denominated assets issued by the London market. 
After the establishment of the US Federal Reserve System in 1913 and the increased
attractiveness of dollar-denominated assets issued by the New York market, the dollar
started to also play an important role as a reserve currency. However, contrary to the
view that there can be only one international currency at any point in time, several
economic historians have shown that the sterling and the dollar coexisted as reserve
currencies until well after the US economy overtook the British economy, and even
after the establishment of the dollar-based Bretton Woods system5. Schenk (2009)
shows that it took ten years after the second world war before the share of dollar
reserves exceeded that of sterling reserves, with the latter still accounting for 30
percent of international foreign-exchange reserves until the late 1960s. Her explana -
tion of the prolongation of sterling’s reserve position until the late 1970s attributes an
important role not only to holders of sterling reserves but also to the United States,
which was keen to ensure the stability of the international monetary system and the
global economic system in general during the Cold War and to share it with a close
military ally. 
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3 The current regime
3.1 Main features
Signiﬁcant changes occurred in the functioning of the international monetary system
in the late 1990s. Following crises in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s, a
series of emerging countries, especially in Latin America but also in East Asia, gave up
exchange-rate pegs and moved to more ﬂexible exchange-rate regimes, although they
generally tried to avoid large exchange-rate variations, while another group, including
dominant players like China and most oil-exporting, Middle-East countries, maintained
various kinds of ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes. The late 1990s was also the beginning
of a historically unprecedented emergence of global imbalances, both in terms of
current-account surpluses and deﬁcits and reserve accumulation. This development
occurred in part as a response to the emerging market crises of this period. In 1999,
the introduction of the euro, an extreme form of monetary integration among several
European countries, also marked a signiﬁcant change to the IMS.
Consequently, the present regime is characterised by:
• Almost universal current-account convertibility. 
• Increasing ﬁnancial-account convertibility. While, however, it is complete or nearly
complete in large parts of the world (especially in Europe and Latin America), a large
group of emerging countries (especially in South and East Asia) retains ﬁnancial-
account controls.
• Mostly free ﬂoating amongst advanced economies or zones, but the persistence of
‘fear-of-ﬂoating’ behaviour in a large part of the emerging and developing world.
• The continued build-up of foreign-exchange reserves by emerging and commodity-
exporting countries. This tendency, which started in the late 1990s, has so far not
been checked by multilateral initiatives.
6. The expression ‘exorbitant privilege’ was coined in 1965 by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, then de Gaulle’s ﬁnance
minister. Gourinchas et al (2010) note that Jacques Rueff referred to the dollar as a ‘boomerang currency’: ‘The
money it [the United States] pays to foreign creditors comes right back home, like a boomerang’ (Rueff, 1971). This
is because the dollars earned by partner countries on trade are reinvested in the United States.
7. See Gourinchas et al (2010).
8. See Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry (2011).
• Infrequent coordinated foreign-exchange market intervention among major central
banks, generally in response to extreme events or market disruptions.
• A still-dominant role of the US dollar for all three international currency functions:
store of value, unit of account and means of payment. 
• Consistent with the still-central role of the dollar in the system, the persistence of
the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of the United States – easy external ﬁnancing contributing
to a positive return differential between external assets and liabilities6.
• The provisioning of liquidity in case of emergencies through IMF facilities, but also
ad-hoc agreements. Bilateral arrangements played a key role during the ﬁnancial
crisis and the provision by the US Federal Reserve of large-scale dollar liquidity lines
to partner central banks can be seen as the ‘exorbitant duty’ implications of issuing
the main international currency7.
• Monetary surveillance and macro-economic policy cooperation at regional (EU) or
multilateral (G20, IMF) levels, with a mixed track-record in terms of effectiveness8.
It is important to observe that in spite of its frequently noted shortcomings (to which
we return below), the system performed well during the global crisis. Disruptions in
wholesale currency markets were swiftly remedied by central banks, at the level of
currency zones but also across borders. The bilateral swap agreements between
central banks agreed upon in 2008-09, in which the Federal Reserve played a key role
(Table 1), proved effective in ensuring continued access to dollar liquidity to non-US
ﬁnancial institutions that usually relied on the US money market. Disruptions in
foreign-exchange markets were minimal. And a signiﬁcant step towards cooperation
between multilateral and regional institutions was taken in 2010 with the provision of
ﬁnancial assistance to Greece and the later formalisation of European regional crisis
management and resolution arrangements.
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Table 1: Bilateral swap lines activated in response to the 2008-2009 financial crisis
Dollar swaps (USD billions) Euro swaps (EUR billions)
Federal Reserve European Central Bank
Euro area (ECB) Without limit* United States 80*
Japan Without limit Denmark 12
United Kingdom Without limit Sweden 10
Switzerland Without limit Euro repos (EUR billions)
Australia 30 European Central Bank
Canada 30 Poland 10
South Korea 30 Hungary 5
Mexico 30 Euro swaps (EUR billions)
Singapore 30 Nordic countries
Sweden 30 Iceland 1.5
Brazil 15 Latvia 0.5
Denmark 15 Swedish krona swap (SEK billions)
Norway 15 Sveriges Riksbank
New Zealand 15 Estonia 10
Renminbi swaps (RMB billions) 
People’s Bank of China** 
Hong Kong 200
South Korea 180
Indonesia 100
Malaysia 80
Argentine 70
Belarus 20
Source: Amended from Allen and Moessner (2010) using data from central banks. Notes: * The ‘unlimited’ supply of
dollars by the Fed is from 13 October 2008, while the €80 billion from the ECB is from April 2009. ** People’s Bank of
China entered swap agreements with four other countries in 2010-11 (Iceland, Singapore, New Zealand and
Uzbekistan), see Vallée (2011).
3.2 Is the current regime unipolar or multipolar? 
The current regime has alternatively been characterised as a multipolar regime (in
which several currencies play international roles) or as a unipolar one (in which there
is a dominant international currency). Some authors (for example Rose, 2007) claim
that what has emerged from the ashes of the Bretton Woods order is a system in which
there is ‘no role for a centre country, the IMF, or gold’, but in which a growing number
9. More detailed statistics and analyses are contained in the report ‘The international role of the euro’, published
annually by the ECB.
of advanced and emerging countries have adopted some form of inﬂation-targeting
and ﬂoat independently. Others (for example Padoa Schioppa, 2010, or, implicitly,
Zhou Xiaochuan, 2009) see the current international monetary regime as one where
the US retains the privileges (as well as duties) accruing to the issuer of the
international currency. Others again (for example Dooley et al, 2004) claim that part
of the world has moved to a ﬂoating regime of the sort described by Rose while another
part lives under a revived Bretton Woods regime centred on the US dollar, which leads
Aglietta (2010) to call it a semi-dollar standard.
To clarify this debate, it is useful to refer to data on the international role of major
currencies. Table 2 shows how the use of the euro and that of the dollar have changed
between 1999 and 20099. First, the table reveals that the euro has gained importance
as a reserve currency for both the oﬃcial and the private sectors. An analysis of yearly
data suggests that this happened primarily in the early years of EMU, while in later
years the euro’s shares have stabilised. A parallel increase occurred in the international
securities and loan markets. By all measurements, the euro had by the end of its ﬁrst
decade achieved a signiﬁcant market share, but it is far from challenging the primacy
of the US dollar. For instance, once exchange-rate variations are accounted for, Dorrucci
and McKay (2011) show that the share of the dollar in global, allocated foreign-
exchange reserves remained stable at around 60 percent between 2002 and 2010,
and that of the euro also stable at just below 30 percent. The share of the yen slightly
declined (from 5 to 3 percent) while those of sterling and residual currencies slightly
increased. At current exchange rates, the share of the dollar declines but remains
largely dominant.
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10. The sample excludes all euro-area countries. Bénassy-Quéré et al (2006) argue that the attrition of intermediate
regimes during this period is the mere consequence of monetary uniﬁcation in Europe, which has transformed the
corresponding intermediate (ERM) regimes into hard pegs.
11. Dooley et al (2004) suggest that the pre-1971 Bretton Woods arrangement, with the US at the centre and a
‘periphery’ of high-growth areas (Europe and Japan) ﬁxing the exchange rate and holding reserves in dollars,
tended to reproduce itself in the last ten years giving rise to a similar arrangement, with China and other rising
economic powers pegging their currency to the dollar and equally (or more) willing to hold dollar assets.
Table 2: Share of the euro (percent) in global markets, 1999-2009
US dollar Euro
1999 2009 1999 2009
Stock of global foreign exchange reserves
(countries reporting to the IMF) 71.0 62.1 17.9 27.6 
Currency anchor, de facto
(trade-weighted) 32.4 38.3 6.6 6.2
FX turnover*
(out of 200%) 90.3 84.9 37.6 39.1 
Stock of international debt securities 
(narrow measure**) 49.0 45.8 20.7 31.4 
Stock of cross-border loans***
(narrow measure**) n.a. 53.8 11.8 20.3 
Denomination of trade with non euro-area countries†
Euro-area exports
Euro-area imports 45.4 56.9
44.4 46.7
Sources: Bracke and Bunda (2011), Dorrucci and McKay (2011), Goldberg and Tille (2009), BIS (2010), ECB (2009).
Notes: * April 2001 and April 2010 data. ** The narrow measure refers to issuance of international bonds and loans in
foreign currency by non-residents of the country issuing the currency in which the issuance is denominated. *** At
constant end-2009 exchange rates. † Unweighted average for eight countries, 2001 and 2007.
As for the unit-of-account functions, the dollar remains key for commodity and energy
markets, although it is less so for manufacturing trade. It also remains dominant for
monetary anchoring. For example, Bénassy-Quéré et al (2006) have estimated that,
from 1999-2004, 92 percent of a sample of 59 currencies were de facto pegged.
Among them, 56 percent were pegged to the US dollar, 14 percent to the euro and 22
percent to a basket10. For 2007, Goldberg (2010) ﬁnds that out of 207 countries, 96
were either dollarised or had their currency pegged to the dollar and another eight were
in a managed ﬂoat against the dollar, resulting in 36 percent of non-US world GDP being
linked to the dollar. This is evidence of the importance of the ‘Bretton Woods 2’ regime
of Dooley et al (2004)11 and also conﬁrms that the euro is still a regional rather than a
global currency (Pisani-Ferry and Posen, 2009). On the whole, the dollar remains the
main pivotal currency for all three monetary functions (means of payment, unit of
account, store of value), while the euro’s role grew to about one-third/one-half of that
of the dollar in the early years of its existence, but has not developed further in later
years. This still-central role of the dollar contrasts strongly with the emergence of a
tripolar economy in which the US will weigh no more than either Europe or East Asia in
the next decades, as we will analyse in section 4.
3.3 Shortcomings of the current regime
Shortcomings of the current monetary system have been repeatedly emphasised
(see, for a recent discussion, Camdessus et al, 2011). They can be summarised as
follows.
• Lack of discipline on the part of dominant players and lack of external adjustment
mech anisms: a monetary system can be regarded as setting the ‘rules of the game’
for participating countries (McKinnon, 1991), yet the IMS works asymmetrically. It
does not provide incentives to countries in external surplus to adjust, nor does it,
because of the international role of the dollar, include such incentives to the United
States when it is in deﬁcit. Discipline is enforced only on non-dominant deﬁcit
countries, yet frequently with a long lag and abruptly when adjustment is enforced,
which leads to unnecessary macroeconomic volatility. International surveillance,
which is a mission of the International Monetary Fund, has failed to substitute for
market-led, disruptive adjustments (a recent case in point was the failure of the
IMF-led multilateral consultations on global imbalances of 2006-07). Although the
role of global imbalances in the genesis of the global crisis is a matter for
controversy (see section 3.4), there are good reasons for tackling ‘excessive’
imbalances per se, and the IMS may have a role to play in this respect.
• Exchange-rate misalignments: research into the effects of currency ﬂuctuations has
shown that moderate, short-term exchange-rate volatility has no signiﬁcant
disadvantages (see eg Clark et al, 2004). However, pronounced and persistent
currency misalignments, possibly resulting in disorderly adjustments, may have
serious consequences because they lead to distortions in economic decisions (as
regards trade, investment, savings, employment, industry developments: see eg
Sallenave 2010). This argument has long been used against ﬂoating exchange rates,
but while these can durably depart from balance, they usually end up reverting to the
long-term mean (Rogoff, 1996). Misalignments are now more often regarded as an
argument against the rigidity of ﬁxed exchange rates, especially in the case of China.
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• Volatile capital flows: ﬁnancial liberalisation has not delivered the expected results:
instead of promoting macroeconomic stability by allowing the absorption of
temporary shocks on income, it has been accompanied by an increased volatility
of capital ﬂows, which have often caused macroeconomic instability. Recent
developments have conﬁrmed the ﬁndings of Kose, et al (2006). Moreover, they
have led a growing number of countries to depart from ﬁnancial-account
convertibility and to introduce capital controls of various sorts (Ostry et al, 2011). 
• Excessive accumulation of reserves: the ineﬃciency of accumulating foreign-
exchange reserves in emerging countries cannot be ignored. The accumulation of
foreign assets is welfare-enhancing for countries that beneﬁt from temporary
revenue increases, notably commodity producers. It can help prevent excessive
appreciation when facing a surge in capital inﬂows. But when used as form of self-
insurance, in response to a lack of trust in multilateral mechanisms, reserve
accumulation for precautionary motives involves unnecessary welfare costs
(Rodrik, 2006). The poor countries’ large-scale investment in low-yielding reserve
assets and the associated savings ﬂows from emerging to advanced countries
(when reserves are ﬁnanced by excess savings) involve signiﬁcant macroeconomic
costs.
• Undetermined global stance: sometimes confused with ‘international liquidity’
(access to credit in the event of capital outﬂows), ‘global liquidity’ refers to the level
of credit at global level (Box 3.1). One of the essential tasks of the IMS is to ensure
adequacy of the global stance. Whether the combination of independent,
domestically centered policies conducted at national level is suﬃcient to ensure
global price and ﬁnancial stability is a matter for discussion. The issue was viewed
secondary in importance during the ‘great moderation’ of the 1990s and the 2000s,
but is returning to the fore in the context of scarce resources (BIS, 2011). 
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Box 3.1: Liquidity management
The lack of a global monetary anchor is repeatedly mentioned as one major ﬂaw of
the IMS. The increased popularity of inﬂation targeting, at least up to 2007, implied
that central banks tended to downplay the role of monetary and credit aggregates in
the conduct of monetary policy. Experience shows that in this situation the world
economy can experience a succession of periods of excess liquidity (accompanied
by asset-price bubbles) and liquidity shortages. 
The lack of international coordination in the supply of global liquidity is not new. The
gold standard was eventually abandoned due to the scarcity of gold and the
tendency of surplus countries to accumulate it at the expense of deﬁcit countries.
The gold-exchange standard did not solve this problem since surplus countries
increasingly preferred to accumulate gold rather than dollars. The SDR was created
as a new, multilateral source of liquidity. However it never played the prominent role
it was supposed to play and now represents less than ﬁve percent of oﬃcial
reserves.
The lasting diﬃculties in building a consistent scheme for liquidity management at
the global level are not surprising considering not only the externalities and spill -
overs arising from domestic liquidity creation, particularly by large countries, but
also problems of deﬁnition, measurement, and institutional support. Conceived at
a time of low capital mobility, the traditional deﬁnition of international liquidity (‘all
the assets of monetary authorities that can be used, directly or through assured
convertibility into other assets, to support its rate of exchange when its external
payments are in deﬁcit’ (Group of Ten, 1965)) focuses on oﬃcial reserves and
ignores liquidities held by the private-sector in countries that have an open capital
account. Therefore this deﬁnition fails to apprehend the transnational use of
liquidities by the private sector and its consequences.
Kenen (1983) has proposed a distinction between oﬃcial and private liquidities.
However, the divide tends to be blurred when a central bank provides liquidity to
another central bank in order for the latter to lend reserve currencies to domestic
ﬁnancial institutions. Additionally, sovereign wealth funds have emerged as major
investors who accumulate liquid reserve assets as well.
Aside from the diﬃcult distinction between public and private liquidity, that between
liquid and illiquid assets tends to be contingent to market appreciation of the
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An important question is whether a new version of the famous Triﬃn dilemma has
arisen in the present system through the build-up of foreign-exchange reserves in
emerging countries, and its unintended consequences. First, these reserves make it
possible for the US to run otherwise unsustainable ﬁscal policies; but there is a
potential discrepancy between the amount of bonds the US government can safely
issue and the global demand for safe, or seemingly safe, US dollar-denominated bonds.
Second, as suggested by Farhi et al (2011), the declining ﬁscal capacity of the US (in
parallel to that of the relative size of the US economy) will progressively undermine
the ability of the US government to back up the provision by the Federal Reserve of
dollar liquidity in times of crisis, which could reduce the attractiveness of the dollar as
the key international currency. In both interpretations, the core of the issue is the
growing gulf between the global monetary and ﬁnancial role of the US and the relative
size of the US economy.
3.4 The IMS, global imbalances, and the global crisis
Global imbalances and the crisis
Beyond the now well-documented deﬁciencies of ﬁnancial regulation, it has been
suggested that global imbalances were a key factor in the genesis of the 2008-09
crisis: capital inﬂows into the US favoured leverage and the formation of a credit bubble
in the run-up to the 2008 meltdown (Larosière, 2009; Turner, 2009; Rajan, 2010).
However, this view is controversial, and there are several versions of it that remain
disputed.
counterparty risk. In times of stress, the notion of liquidity tends to narrow, whereas
in calm times a wide variety of assets is considered liquid, even when not denomi -
nated in a key reserve currency.
Finally, global liquidity, which is a monetary-policy concept, should be distinguished
from international liquidity, a balance-of-payment concept. Global liquidity can be
thought as the sum of international and domestic liquidities.
Destais and Zdzienicka (2011) provide a discussion of the identiﬁcation, measure -
ment and management of liquidity and their connection to the international
monetary system.
Eichengreen (2009b) spells out the case by arguing that the simultaneous presence
of excess domestic demand in the US and savings in emerging Asia, coupled with the
portfolio preferences of investors in surplus countries, generated large and persistent
capital ﬂows that contributed to maintain exceptionally lax ﬁnancial conditions in the
US for a long period. Starting from a similar premise, King (2010) elaborates on the
macroeconomic policies that would have been needed to reabsorb the global
imbalances, thus contributing to maintaining ﬁnancial stability. Portes (2009) goes
further considering global imbalances to be ‘the ultimate cause of the current ﬁnancial
crisis’. Borio and Disyatat (2011) have challenged these views, arguing that what
matters for generating credit and asset-price booms is not current account imbalances,
but rather the underlying ﬁnancing channels. This objection seems to some extent
semantic, however. Given different portfolio preferences of surplus and deﬁcit
countries, and in particular the higher propensity of surplus countries to invest in liquid
ﬁxed-income assets issued by major ﬁnancial centres (the US and, to a lesser extent,
the euro area), it follows that sizeable current-account imbalances leading to the
transfer of large amounts of wealth from deﬁcit to surplus countries, imply sizeable
increases in the demand for dollar-denominated safe assets, which in turn encourages
the issuance of such short-run assets by ﬁnancial intermediaries, hence leverage,
risk-taking and asset-price booms. 
Why imbalances?
Global imbalances are, however, a mere symptom. There have also been discussions
about the respective roles of US monetary policy and asset demand in the creation of
global imbalances.
A ﬁrst set of contributions (see Taylor, 2008; Rajan, 2010, and, for an early warning,
White, 2006) emphasises the effects of US monetary policy. They argue that in keeping
interest rates low to stave off deﬂation and in targeting price stability of goods and
services only, the Federal Reserve fuelled the real-estate bubble and allowed leverage
to increase in the ﬁnancial sector. Here, the international monetary regime is only
indirectly responsible in the sense that it did not constrain the Federal Reserve to carry
out a stricter monetary policy.
A second set of contributions (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009) assigns res -
ponsibility to the high demand for triple-A rated dollar-denominated assets. In this
interpretation, the high demand for safe assets had two effects. The ﬁrst was to depress
yields on Treasury Bills, contributing to the rise of debt. The other was to encourage
the production of seemingly safe assets, via the securitisation and tranching of
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12. Central banks tend to prefer sovereign assets. According to Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008), this high
demand for triple-A assets could have led ﬁnancial intermediaries to ‘create’ other triple-A assets to satisfy private
investors. 
13. Source: IMF COFER database. Not all reserves are recorded, as some countries, such as China, do not notify the
composition of their holdings.
14. On top of these economic arguments, the political economy of global imbalances may prove detrimental since
they tend to reinforce demands for protection in deﬁcit countries, while favouring the build-up of powerful groups
of exporters lobbying against adjustment in surplus countries.
subprime mortgages. According to this view, the international monetary regime can
also be held directly responsible, because a large share of the demand for triple-A rated
assets came from the central banks of countries pegged to the dollar12. Dollar reserves
declared to the IMF by developing countries rose from $255 billion at the beginning of
1999 to $1353 billion at the end of the second quarter of 2008, just before the collapse
of Lehman Brothers13. Warnock and Warnock (2009) ﬁnd that oﬃcial capital ﬂows into
the United States could have depressed long-term yields by as much as 100 basis
points in 2005, which is a signiﬁcant effect. In addition, a substantial share of this
foreign capital was invested in securities issued by agencies (Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac), which further contributed to the expansion of the real-estate bubble. Bernanke
(2011) considers that the demand for safe assets ‘provided additional incentives for
the US ﬁnancial services industry to develop structured investment products’.
Beside their possible role in the genesis of the crisis, Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti
(2011) argue that, although they may reﬂect optimal capital allocation at global level
(as well as consumption-smoothing on a country-by-country basis), external
imbalances should be a cause for concern. This is the case when they result from
domestic distortions, such as ﬁnancial repression or exuberance, the lack of social
safety nets or the lack of exchange-rate ﬂexibility (Box 3.2), and when their eventual
abrupt unwinding threatens ﬁnancial stability through sudden stops and currency
crashes. Finally, due to asymmetric incentives to adjust in deﬁcit and surplus
countries, global imbalances may introduce deﬂationary pressure at global level if
adjustment efforts in deﬁcit countries lead to a shortfall in global demand14.
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BOX 3.2: Magnitude and drivers of global imbalances
Since the mid-1990s, current account imbalances have widened across the global
economy (Figure 1). Several factors account for this widening. 
Figure 1: Current account imbalances (percent of world GDP), 1980-2010
Source: Adapted from Figure 1 of Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) using data from the IMF’s World Economic
Outlook Database.
Note. The composition of country groups is as follows:
Euro area 17: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain. 
Rest of the EU: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, United
Kingdom.
Emerging Asia: Hong Kong S.A.R. of China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan province of
China, Thailand.
Oil exporters: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago,
United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Yemen.
Rest of the world: remaining countries.
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
-3%
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
United States Euro area 17 Rest of the EU
China Oil Emerging Asia
Japan Rest of the world Discrepancy
GLOBAL CURRENCIES FOR TOMORROW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
29
15. Cultural factors in some Asian countries are also sometimes given as a possible reason. However, while these
certainly play an important role in economic decisions, it may not explain the change in many Asian countries
from more or less balanced current accounts to very high surpluses over relatively short periods.
16. Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) discuss three phases of the build-up of global imbalances between 1996
and 2008 and the role played by different factors during these phases.
17. It should be recalled that in many countries, including China and India, large segments of the population do not have
access to the formal ﬁnancial system (Prasad, 2009).
Drivers of surpluses
In emerging and developing countries, domestic savings may exceed domestic
investment for several reasons15, 16:
• Intertemporal consumption-smoothing in countries beneﬁtting from rising oil and
raw material export revenues. This primarily applies to Middle Eastern countries.
• Demographic factors, such as ageing and, in China, the delayed impact of the
one-child policy.
• Limited social safety nets that result in high household saving rates. This also
applies to China, though the increase in its surplus can also be ascribed to
corporate and government savings.
• Self-insurance against crises in countries such as South Korea that experienced
balance-of-payment crises in the past and prefer self-insurance to running the
risk of an IMF programme.
• Export-led growth strategies: this primarily applies to China where the ﬁxed or
nearly-ﬁxed exchange-rate policy is only one element of a broader economic
strategy. Distortions in favour of the traded-goods sector, state-owned enterprises
and exporting companies are also instrumental in creating external surpluses.
• Underdeveloped or inefficient financial markets, which reduce the possibility for
non-ﬁnancial agents to borrow17. Also, ﬁnancial markets may not offer appropriate
investment vehicles, leading local investors to invest in US assets (the so-called
‘asset shortage hypothesis’ of Caballero, 2009). This hypothesis was initially
developed to account for Latin American behaviour (Mendoza et al, 2008) but
has relevance for other countries.
18. The ‘global savings glut’ hypothesis was challenged by Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010), on the basis that it should
have caused a boom in global savings and investments and also an investment boom in countries that imported
capital, which by and large have not happened.
19. Although the US dollar continues to be the world’s dominant currency, safe assets can also be produced by eg
Germany and Japan, but these two major economies have not experienced current account deﬁcits.
20. A variant of the savings-glut explanation of the US deﬁcit is the role of the United States as a ‘world venture capitalist’
that invests in high-yield, risky foreign assets while ﬁnancing itself through riskless bond issuance. With higher
remuneration on the asset side than on the liability one, the country can afford a deﬁcit over a long period. The
(dis)equilibrium is self-sustaining due to the difference in sophistication in ﬁnancial markets (see Gourinchas and
Rey, 2005; Cooper, 2008).
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• Domestic distortions: in China, state-owned enterprises accumulated large saving
balances because they had until 2008 no obligation to distribute dividends and
beneﬁtted from market distortions (Huang and Wang, 2010). 
Drivers of deficits
Various theories have been offered to account for the US current account deﬁcit: 
• A ﬁrst explanation blames an exceedingly lax monetary policy, either in the US
(Taylor, 2008) or globally (BIS, 2008). According to this view, policy rates in the
aftermath of the 2001 recession remained too low for too long, triggering both
asset-price inﬂation and generalised leverage. The resulting fall in domestic
savings and the increase in consumption widened the trade and current-account
deﬁcits.
• The second explanation is the ‘global savings glut’, ie excess foreign demand for
safe US assets. According to this view, ﬁrst put forward by Ben Bernanke (2005),
net capital ﬂows into the US lowered long-term interest rates, which in turn
favoured leverage, the housing bubble, excessive risk-taking, and a decline in
savings18, 19. However self serving for the US, Bernanke’s thesis pointed out that
ﬁnancial globalisation and the foreign appetite for US Treasury bonds had to be
considered when analysing the current account deﬁcit20.
As Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) point out, many of the factors mentioned
above are interrelated. For example, rapid growth in China and other emerging
markets drove up oil and other commodity prices, thereby increasing the bill for
commodity importers and revenues for exporters. Savings from oil revenues
contributed to the fall in interest rates and thereby the emergence of unsustainable
booms.
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The IMS and the prevention of global imbalances
Whatever the reasons for global imbalances, it is diﬃcult to understand why relative
prices did not respond to them: even when nominal exchange rates are ﬁxed, prices
should have adjusted (Box 3.3). The reason this did not happen can be found in the
combination of nominal exchange-rate rigidity (notably in China) and capital controls
(Jeanne, 2011). The ability of a central bank to control both the nominal exchange
through foreign-exchange interventions, and domestic inﬂation through sterilisation
rests on the existence of capital controls: should they be relaxed, large capital inﬂows
would limit the central bank’s ability to sterilise its interventions. The ‘rules of the game’
may therefore impact both the emergence and the duration of imbalances. 
Summing up, the role of the IMS in the build-up of the pre-2008 global imbalances
should not be downplayed, but its direct responsibility for the crisis remains disputed. 
21. Among the countless references, a comprehensive one is the textbook by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).
BOX 3.3: The IMS and external adjustment: concepts and evidence
The classic theories of the balance of payments, originating from the works of
Harberger, Johnson, Meade and Mundell on external adjustment, from Branson,
Dornbusch, Frankel, Henderson and Kouri on exchange rates, and from more recent
reﬁnements and extensions by ‘new open economy’ theorists such as Obstfeld
and Rogoff, postulate that external imbalances arise and are subsequently brought
back to equilibrium by a combination of adjustments of exchange rates, aggregate
demand and output. These adjustments are triggered either by spontaneous
market forces or by policy actions, undertaken by governments or central banks.
While we do not wish to present an extensive survey21, it is useful to brieﬂy recall
how these mechanisms operate, and then focus on how they might interact with the
IMS.
Real exchange-rate adjustment is the most direct and immediate factor behind
balance-of-payment changes. The relationship between the real exchange rate and
the current account can be understood in various ways. First, assuming trade
elasticities are suﬃciently large, a real depreciation, by making domestic tradables
cheaper relative to foreign ones, tends to boost exports and reduce imports, hence
to move the trade balance into surplus or to eliminate an existing deﬁcit. This is the
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traditional competitiveness effect. 
Second, a real depreciation tends to shift domestic demand from tradable goods to
non-tradable goods, thereby improving the current account. Note that this remains
the case even if tradables are subject to the law of one price. 
Finally, to the extent that it makes the relative price of foreign assets higher than
domestic assets, a currency depreciation reduces net capital outﬂows or encourages
net capital inﬂows.
Importantly, real exchange-rate changes can be the result of nominal exchange-rate
adjustment and/or of inﬂation differentials. The ﬁrst channel is faster than the
second one, but in the long run, the exchange-rate regime should not affect the real
exchange-rate, provided adjustments in the latter are not impeded by a combination
of capital controls and sterilised foreign exchange interventions (Jeanne, 2011).
Nominal exchange-rate changes can be market driven or policy driven. In the ﬁrst
case, the exchange-rate variation derives from the implications of the balance-of-
payment imbalance on foreign exchange markets: a deﬁcit country will see the
demand for its currency decline relative to the demand for other currencies. Note,
however, that such an adjustment may be delayed if the current-account imbalances
are automatically counterbalanced by systematic capital ﬂows in the opposite
direction, as has been argued to be the case in recent years between the US and its
creditor countries. In any event, empirical analyses of recent current-account
imbalances between the US, the euro area and Japan conﬁrm that, sooner or later,
external adjustment requires considerable changes in real exchange rates (see eg
Chinn and Lee, 2005; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2006).
The second adjustment channel works through demand, income and employment.
A deﬁcit in the home country shifts income from the domestic economy to the rest
of the world. Under normal conditions, this shift gradually raises the level of foreign
absorp tion compared to the domestic one, which reduces the deﬁcit through lower
imports and higher exports. The extent and the speed of the mechanism depend on
private spending behaviour and on possible changes in macroeconomic policies
(monetary and ﬁscal) that may occur in the meantime. The income-adjustment
channel implies, empirically, that balance-of-payment deﬁcits should be preceded
by output expansions and followed by corresponding contractions. The extensive
evidence provided, for example, by Edwards (2004, 2005) clearly conﬁrms that the
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22. The evidence was particularly stark after the recent crisis, when, despite the US being the main initial source of
ﬁnancial risks, the demand for dollar assets increased at the peak of the ﬁnancial turmoil and the dollar appreciated.
Yet this conclusion is to be nuanced, as Jeanne (2011) observes, since the US produced two kinds of safe assets
before the crisis: US Treasuries and AAA-rated complex market securities. At the outbreak of the crisis there was a
complete and sudden stop in the second asset class and an increased demand for Treasuries. 
major current-account adjustments in the post-Bretton Woods era were accom -
panied by sizeable GDP ﬂuctuations, according to the pattern just described.
Faruquee et al (2006) suggest that a qualitatively similar result holds for the US.
It is important to keep in mind that the income-adjustment channel is not in practice
separate from the real exchange-rate channel: a shift in aggregate demand from
deﬁcit to surplus countries will itself trigger a real exchange-rate adjustment, since
relative demand is weakened in the deﬁcit country (which is deﬂationary) and
boosted in the surplus country (which is inﬂationary).
These mechanisms operate differently depending on the IMS, notably depending
on whether international payments are made (and reserves kept) in an externally
created monetary instrument (‘outside money’), or in the currency of the dominant
country (‘inside money’, for example the dollar in the post-1973 dollar standard). In
an ‘inside money’ arrangement, the dominant country faces no constraint in setting
its policies, such as the availability of the ‘outside asset’. The lack of incentive to
readjust tends to increase the size and persistence of external deﬁcits (Eichengreen
and Adalet, 2005). This incentive effect is asymmetric because it acts only in case
of a deﬁcit – in the case of a surplus, policies are not constrained regardless of the
payment arrangement. 
After the Asian crisis, the precautionary demand for reserves among emerging
countries increased, and the demand for dollars was further boosted by the recurring
episodes of ﬁnancial instability after the late 1990s (safe-haven effect)22. As
described above, the trend increase in the demand for dollars effectively delayed the
working of the exchange-rate mechanism. Still, the real exchange-rate adjustment
should have taken place through the demand and portfolio channels: countries with
undervalued exchange rates should have experienced higher inﬂation and higher
capital inﬂows (due to the low relative price of domestic assets). This did not take
place for different reasons: depressed domestic demand due to high saving rates
(China) or low investment rates (other emerging Asia countries) and capital controls
that prevented private investors from exploiting expected return differentials.
23. Source: http://www.g20-g8.com/g8-g20/g20/english/priorities-for-france/the-priorities-of-the-french-presidency/
sheets/international-monetary-system-ims.351.html
3.5 IMS reform and the G20 
In the wake of efforts by the Korean G20 presidency in 2010 to create ‘international
ﬁnancial safety nets’, France made reform of the IMS one of the priorities of its G20
presidency in 2011. Its aims were:
• To reinforce macroeconomic coordination based on the Framework for Strong,
Sustainable and Balanced Growth. 
• To reduce the need for reserve accumulation through reinforcing ﬁnancial safety
nets. 
• To give the IMF oversight authority on capital ﬂows. 
• To provide support for the internationalisation of major emerging countries’
currencies, through changes in exchange-rate regimes and/or SDR-related
schemes23.
The strategy followed by the French presidency has been to open discussion on the
ﬂaws of the IMS and proposals for partial reforms without promoting any general
comprehensive blueprint. In particular, the French authorities have been careful to
stress that there was no willingness to return to a ﬁxed exchange-rate system or to
impose target zones. Rather, they have presented IMS reform as a way to complement
G20 efforts to reduce global imbalances and to reduce the risk of ‘currency wars’. 
The French emphasis on the IMS was widely shared after the rise of the ‘currency wars’
theme in autumn 2010, following the announcement by the Federal Reserve of a new
round of quantitative easing, and moves towards intervention and capital controls in
the emerging world. However, among G20 countries there is a tendency for each
country to point to different ﬂaws in the IMS and to promote different reform options.
For instance, the United States insists on the need for Chinese reform of its exchange-
rate regime, whereas China emphasises the need to develop new reserve assets to
supplement the dollar. Other emerging countries are especially concerned by carry
trades and the risk of exchange-rate overshooting. Hence, the initial agreement on
general principles has tended to evaporate when speciﬁcities have started to be
discussed (Box 3.4).
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24. The communiqué’s vocabulary is somewhat confusing as the notion of ‘global liquidity’ usually refers to the global
monetary stance. Access to liquidity in times of stress through bilateral, regional or multilateral facilities is usually
referred to as ‘international liquidity’. 
BOX 3.4: IMS reform under the French presidency of the G20
Three G20 meetings shaped the IMS debate in the first few months of 2011. On
19 February 2011, the final communiqué of the Paris meeting of the G20 finance
ministers and central bank governors concentrated on capital flows and on the
countries’ access to liquidity when facing sudden stops or capital flow
reversals24:
“Today we agreed on a work program aimed at strengthening the functioning of the
IMS, including through coherent approaches and measures to deal with potentially
destabilizing capital flows, among which macro-prudential measures, mindful of
possible drawbacks; and management of global liquidity to strengthen our capacity
to prevent and deal with shocks, including issues such as Financial Safety Nets and
the role of the SDR.”
On 31 March 2011, a high-level G20 seminar on IMS reform was hosted in Nanjing
(China) to discuss these issues openly. The discussion was organised around the
same two items (liquidity and capital controls) but touched upon several other
aspects of IMS reform.
On 14-15 April 2011, the final communiqué of the meeting of finance ministers
and central bank governors in Washington DC was more specific on liquidity
provision and capital controls, while also mentioning the need for broadening IMF
surveillance (including through oversight on policy spillovers and exchange-rate
policies): 
“To strengthen the international monetary system, we agreed to focus our work, in
the short term, on assessing developments in global liquidity, a country specific
analysis regarding drivers of reserve accumulation, a strengthened coordination to
avoid disorderly movements and persistent exchange rates misalignments, a
criteria-based path to broaden the composition of the SDR, an improved toolkit to
strengthen the global financial safety nets, enhanced cooperation between the IMF
and regional financial arrangements, the development of local capital markets and
domestic currency borrowing, coherent conclusions for the management of capital
flows drawing on country experiences. We also agreed on the need to strengthen
25. It was agreed at the Bretton Woods conference to treat differently the IMF members’ commitments as regards the
current account and as regards the ﬁnancial (at the time called the capital) account. The preservation of the
members’ right to maintain capital controls was deemed essential, not least by John Maynard Keynes, to ensure
policy autonomy. In the late 1990s an attempt was made to broaden the IMF mandate to include the surveillance
of the ﬁnancial account, but it did not succeed. In recent international discussions major emerging countries
emphasised that they could not agree to submit their capital control policies to international oversight because such
an approach would not treat them and the advanced countries symmetrically. 
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At time of writing (spring 2011), the debate was evolving around three key issues
among a wider set of potential deliverables (Table 3):
• Policy coordination and surveillance: because large capital ﬂows from advanced to
emerging economies could be explained both by push factors (eg US quantitative
easing) and pull ones (high interest rates in emerging countries), it had become
clear that G20 partners could only agree on a symmetric approach to surveillance
where capital controls would be treated as one of several policy tools along with
monetary and ﬁscal policies. However, while there is little appetite to modify Article
6 of the IMF Articles of Agreement, there is still a possibility for the Fund to exercise
surveillance over capital controls within the broader framework of multilateral and
bilateral (Article 4) surveillance, and for the G20 to address the issue as part of
global policy coordination.
• Liquidity: there was broad agreement to continue improving a country’s access to
liquidity when facing reversals of capital ﬂows. This would possibly include
improved coordination of regional and multilateral ﬁnancial safety nets, for which
experience with euro-area crisis may provide a template; clariﬁcation of the
conditions for accessing bilateral swap lines in the case of crises; and procedures
for assessing global liquidity so that global liquidity stress could possibly trigger
liquidity provision to countries in need of it.
• SDR basket: while ambitious projects such as the development of the SDR as a
further the effectiveness and coherence of bilateral and multilateral IMF
surveillance, particularly on financial sector coverage, fiscal, monetary and
exchange rate policies.”
However, emerging countries have so far objected to giving to the IMF a mandate to
oversee policies affecting the ﬁnancial account in the same way it oversees policies
affecting the current account25.
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reserve asset had been abandoned, discussions were going on about the possible
inclusion of new currencies in the SDR basket, depending on their status vis-à-vis
criteria for inclusion (and the interpretation of the ‘freely usable’ requirement). The
inclusion of the renminbi in the basket was viewed as a way to encourage China to
open up its ﬁnancial account while allowing the People’s Bank of China to pro -
gressively diversify its reserves and simultaneously reinforcing the capacity of SDR
central banks to swap SDRs for hard currencies. China, however, was careful not to
appear as calling for this. 
Table 3: Main G20 deliverables on IMS reform
Aim Possible deliverables
Improve IMF surveillance More effective IMF surveillance of national economic policies,
especially for systemic countries. ‘Teeth’ for surveillance
(formal recommendations, possibly sanctions). In addition,
more effective multilateral surveillance via spillover reports.
Changes in IMF governance, eg relating to the IMF statutes
(stronger and restructured Executive Board, greater role for
ministers, possibility of sanctions) 
Supervise capital controls Non-binding code of conduct for capital controls policies.
Possible extension of IMF mandate to surveillance of financial
accounts.
Modify exchange-rate regimes Non-binding code of conduct for FX intervention policies.
Move towards more flexible exchange-rate regimes.
Coordinated FX interventions in case of market turmoil (as for
yen on 17 March 2011).
Strengthen financial safety nets Institutionalisation of bilateral or regional swap lines.
(international liquidity) Reserve pooling at regional or multilateral levels.
More frequent SDR allocations.
Debt issuance by the IMF in case of necessity.
Develop SDR as a reserve asset Issuance of SDR-denominated debt by official and private
entities.
Substitution account to offset exchange-rate impact of changes
in the composition of reserves. 
Use of SDR as a unit of account for exchange-rate pegs,
commodities quotation. 
SDR invoicing (eg for energy, commodities).
‘Criteria-based path’ to broaden the composition of the SDR.
Manage global liquidity Strengthened coordination between central banks.
Source: Bruegel/CEPII.
There is evidently a trade-off between the strength and effectiveness of an
international monetary regime’s basic rules and the reliance on discretionary
surveillance. The G20 has clearly opted for the latter path. Following up on the
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, the G20 had already decided
to endorse the IMF proposal for Spillover Reports on ﬁve systemically important
countries or areas (the United States, the euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom, and
China); and to operationalise the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) launched at
Pittsburgh by identifying speciﬁc criteria and indicators, to be used in a two-step
procedure (Box 3.5). 
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26. This box draws on Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry (2011). 
BOX 3.5: International surveillance and the G20 Mutual Assessment 
Process (MAP)26
The aim of the ‘Mutual Assessment Process’ (MAP) launched by the G20 in 2009 is
to develop ‘a forward-looking analysis of whether policies pursued by individual G20
countries are collectively consistent with more sustainable and balanced trajectories
for the global economy’. The name of the game is to make all participating govern -
ments more conscious of the international spillover effects of their actions and,
through peer pressure, to lead them to amend policy course in case of global
inconsistency. The MAP is not about introducing systemic reforms but ensuring
ongoing surveillance and policy coordination. 
The strategy for making coordination work was to ask each country to submit
medium-term policy frameworks and plans. The IMF was entrusted with the task of
checking consistency of national assumptions and policy directions, providing
feedback to G20 members and evaluating policy alternatives. 
The MAP exercise has been carried out twice, in spring 2010 for the preparation of the
Toronto summit and in autumn 2010 for the preparation of the Seoul summit. It is
intended to carry out another MAP round for the preparation of the Cannes summit.
To support it, a set of indicators and guidelines intended to help tackle global
imbalances through policy adjustment in the key countries was adopted in April
2011 at the G20 ministerial in Washington, DC. 
The MAP is a cumbersome exercise technically that results in projections of
uncertain accuracy. Open discussion may or may not trigger policy action. The
strategy is to help focus the policy discussion within the G20 on the most signiﬁcant
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What these procedures will in the end deliver is uncertain. On the one hand they create
a framework for a learning process, which is important for countries not used to
discussing their domestic economic policies. On the other hand there is a risk that they
may have very little effective traction on actual policy choices. Only a signiﬁcant
change to the IMF Articles of Agreement to give its surveillance more teeth could
guarantee the effectiveness of surveillance. 
cases while avoiding singling out problem countries. Only facts will tell whether this
has proved a fruitful approach.
It is important to note that the MAP is institutionally distinct from IMF surveillance.
Because the IMF provides support to the G20 and carries out the technical work, the
two processes are coordinated, but the Fund remains responsible for its statutory
task and it has recently launched new processes for improving its own surveillance
(for instance vulnerability assessments and spillover reports on the major
economies). 
4 Economic conditions and the
monetary order
In this section we address the economic background of international monetary
perspectives. There are four dimensions to this analysis: 
• The ﬁrst one, which is also the most straightforward, is that of sheer economic
strength; throughout recent history there has been a link (albeit a complex one)
between such strength and monetary leadership, and this is likely to apply in the
decades to come.
• The second one has to do with the ability of a country or a group of countries to
exercise monetary leadership. Beyond strength, this ability depends on ﬁnancial
development, on the quality of economic and ﬁnancial institutions, on the nature
and effectiveness of governance, and on an economic power’s political might and
commitment to global leadership. 
• The third one relates to the likely evolution of global ﬁnancial conditions: whether
the world economy will continue moving towards ﬁnancial openness and which
countries will be capital exporters or importers. 
• The fourth and ﬁnal one, which is of a somewhat different nature, concerns the
evolution of monetary and exchange-rate policy regimes. These are evidently
endogenous to the evolution of the international monetary system, but national
choices of policy doctrines and regimes also depend on other factors, such as the
experience gained from policy episodes and the priorities assigned to monetary
and exchange-rate policies. 
In what follows we take up each of these dimensions in turn. 
40
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4.1 The changing balance of economic power
Figure 2 provides a bird eye’s view of the evolution of the world economy and the
distribution of economic power from 1870 to 2050, at 2005 exchange rates27.
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the share of the largest economy
in world GDP (at real exchange rates of 2005) consistently remained above 15 percent.
For most of the Gold Standard period (1879-1913), the sterling area composed of the
UK and its main colonies met this criterion. It was either the dominant power in terms
of GDP or a close second to the US. Throughout the Bretton Woods period (1945-1973),
the US was the undisputed dominant power, with a weight consistently over one-fourth
of world GDP. 
But according to long-term projections, the world economy in the twenty-ﬁrst century
is likely to see the emergence of two new dominant players: China and India. China
should overtake the US around 2035, at constant relative prices. By the middle of the
century, US weight should be down to less than 20 percent and, unless signiﬁcant
enlargements take place, the eurozone’s weight will be down to 10 percent. Even
assuming enlargement of the euro area to the current EU and beyond, its weight is
unlikely to reach 15 percent. In contrast, China could weigh one fourth of the global
economy at the 2050 horizon, and India almost as much as the euro area. In the
meantime – say, in the next 10 to 20 years – there will be an interregnum during which
economic power will be much more evenly distributed amongst a core group of
countries. It is in this period that the new IMS will take shape on the basis of policy
choices now discussed.
It should be noted here that the shortcoming of current monetary arrangements
mentioned in the previous section would be likely to become more acute as the global
economy moves further in the direction of multipolarity. For instance, the global
demand for liquid, riskless international reserves would probably grow faster than the
supply the United States could provide while keeping public ﬁnances on a sustainable
track. Similarly, the Federal Reserve would probably become less willing to extend
large enough volumes of international liquidity in times of crisis, and the US Treasury
27. The ﬁgure is based on Angus Maddison’s historical statistics (available from the Groningen Growth and Development
Centre at www.ggdc.net) and long-term economic projections prepared by CEPII (Fouré et al, 2010). Most available
long-term projections result in a qualitatively similar picture of the future of the world economy, so our
developments here are not contingent on the use of a particular projection. Since monetary and ﬁnancial power is
related to international rather than domestic purchasing power of GDP, we prefer to work at observed exchange
rates of 2005 rather than in purchasing power parity standards. Using current exchange rates would even be
preferable, but historical series are not available.
may become less able to back it up if it does. The benign-neglect stance of US
authorities concerning the value of the dollar could be reconsidered once the US is no
longer a price-maker, increasing the risk of ‘currency wars’. In a nutshell, the US might
no longer be powerful enough, or determined enough, to play the role of a ‘benevolent
hegemon’. Conversely, the lack of monetary autonomy in emerging countries will
increasingly put macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability at risk in these countries, as
exempliﬁed recently in China. Finally, the rising size of China will de facto increase the
size of the dollar bloc in the global economy, reducing the scope for exchange-rate led
balance-of-payment adjustments. We come back to these issues in section 5. What is
important to note here is that the deep transformation of the global economy will exert
market pressure for a transformation of the IMS.
Figure 2: Percentage shares of selected countries and areas in world GDP, 1870-
2050 (at 2005 exchange rates)
Sources: Angus Maddison’s historical statistics and CEPII projections. Notes: * Australia (up to 1900), New Zealand (up
to 1939), India (up to 1946). Canada is not included as it was already granted significant autonomy in 1867. Euro area
(9): Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal. Since data for some small
economies are not available for some earlier years before 1980, the world total suffers from compositional changes.
However, since the share of these countries is small, the bias in shares before 1980 is also small.
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28. According to Eichengreen and Flandreau (2010), network externalities should however not be overstated, while the
role of ﬁnancial regulations and public support (through the behaviour of the central bank) proved to be of key
importance in the race between the pound and the dollar in the interwar period. Even the actual importance of
currencies in different historical periods is often contentious. For example, Eichengreen and Flandreau (2010)
argue that, although the dollar overtook the pound sterling as the leading reserve currency in the mid-1920s, the
pound regained the ﬁrst place after the deviation of the dollar in 1933 and kept it till the mid-1950s. 
29. Sources: Eichengreen (2011) and IMF COFER database.
The implications for monetary arrangements of changes in economic power should,
however,be discussed with caution. The experience of the ﬁrst half of the twentieth
century indicates that the British pound retained a key monetary role long after the
UK had lost its economic dominance. This suggests that incumbency matters and that
the impact of economic power on monetary power is likely to be delayed. Furthermore,
two international currencies can coexist for extended periods of time, and reversals
of fortune are even possible (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2009).
Economists generally ascribe the time lag between the acquisition of dominant
economic weight and its monetary counterpart to ‘network externalities’: the beneﬁts
of using currencies internationally actually increase with their use, which favour the
incumbent currency28. But path-dependency is not the only factor. State-dependent
factors matter too: economic size is far from being the only determinant of international
currency status.
4.2 Critical determinants of currency status 
The example of Japan in the 1980s and the 1990s is indicative of the fact that
economic ascendancy is not suﬃcient for a currency to acquire international status.
Whereas Japan had reached number two status in terms of GDP – and was projected
to rise further – and in spite of it being a major trading power, the yen never became a
major international currency. At its peak in 1991 the yen only accounted for 8 percent
of world reserves. By end 2010 its share in allocated reserves was down to less than
4 percent29.
Critical factors for acquiring international currency status are several. The list certainly
includes: 
• The size, depth and openness of ﬁnancial markets, especially the sovereign bond
market. International asset-holders value the existence of a deep and liquid bond
market, where they can trade in large amounts without having a material impact on
prices. 
30. Eichengreen (2011) mentions a remark by Susan Strange, the political economist, according to whom a major
difference between the US dollar and the German mark until the 1990s was that it was possible to imagine a Russian
invasion of Germany but not a Canadian invasion of the US. Posen (2008) emphasises the importance of military
power among the determinants of international currency status. The lack of military power may have been one
factor behind the limited internationalisation of the yen in the 1980s and 1990s, the other factor being the low
level of Japanese interest rates that failed to make yen-denominated bonds attractive reserve assets but rather
triggered carry trade (hence capital outﬂows). 
• The reliability of the rules and institutions that provide the legal basis of ﬁnancial
transactions and ensure the enforceability of contracts. A ﬁnancial asset is
underpinned by a contract between a borrower and a lender, and whether or not this
contract can be enforced in a predictable way matters considerably to investors.
• The quality and predictability of ﬁscal and monetary policies. The rating and value
of sovereign debt securities depend on whether budgetary policy is sustainable
and on whether monetary policy is geared towards maintaining price stability. Both
affect the country’s exchange rate. 
• The ability of policymakers to respond to unexpected ﬁnancial shocks and in
particular the ability of the central bank to act as a lender of last resort vis-à-vis
domestic and international institutions. Also of importance is the ability of ﬁnancial
intermediaries to carry out cross-border operations as well as to absorb shocks, as
well as the stance of policymakers vis-à-vis the internationalisation of the currency:
in inﬂuencing market expectations, it matters whether the authorities are favourable
or reluctant to its internationalisation. 
• Non-economic factors such as political cohesion and sheer geopolitical power. It
matters for investor whether the political institutions underpinning a currency are
strong enough to cope with geopolitical risks30.
Table 4 summarises the respective situations of the US dollar, the euro and the
renminbi with respect to these criteria. It indicates that there are several reasons why
the dollar remains unrivalled. Its main, not negligible, weakness arises from concerns
over the sustainability of budgetary policy and the possible monetary consequences
of debt unsustainability. 
The euro has several attributes that could make it a good candidate for a major
international role, but it is still handicapped by its incomplete governance and the lack
of political cohesion. These factors may be of secondary importance in normal times
but they matter considerably in times of crisis when the ability of the governance
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31. Stark (2010) states unequivocally the position of the ECB: ‘Countries which unilaterally introduce the euro would
do so in their responsibility and at their own risk, without committing the EU or the ECB. The ECB would thus pursue
a policy of non-engagement and non-support towards these countries.’
regime to cope with unexpected shocks is being tested. Furthermore, the euro area
authorities are oﬃcially neutral vis-à-vis a broader international use of the euro and
discourage the unilateral adoption of the euro by non-EU countries31.
Beyond technicalities, a bigger issue is that the euro is a currency without a state. The
ﬁnancial crisis and its aftermath have proved that this does not need to be a fatal ﬂaw.
But they have also shown that Tommaso (Padoa-Schioppa, 2004, p181) was right to
say that ‘ultimately, the security on which a sound currency assesses its role cannot
be provided exclusively by the central bank. It rests on a number of elements that only
the state, or more broadly, a polity can provide’ (Padoa Schioppa, 2004, p181).
Whether this polity is in the process of being formed is a major question for the future
of the euro as an international currency. 
Table 4 suggests that the renminbi has signiﬁcant handicaps in the short term, due to
the limited openness and development of China’s ﬁnancial markets, a weaker legal
system, and a weaker policy record, but it has strong political underpinnings. Provided
that legal ﬁnancial reforms are carried out in China and expectations for continued
strong economic growth are fulﬁlled, it could gradually become a major challenger,
and ultimately the main challenger to the dollar (see Dobson and Masson, 2009;
Thimann, 2009; Vallée, 2011).
There is therefore a dominant incumbent and two potential rivals. The ﬁrst, the euro,
has many of the attributes of an international currency and already a sizeable share
in foreign exchange reserves and international bond issuances, but weak governance
and political foundations. The second, the renminbi, has strong underpinnings in terms
of economic potential and coherence in policymaking but it is still far from having
acquired the characteristics of an international currency. In short, for the time being the
euro will not be dominant and the renminbi cannot, and this gives the dollar a still-
unrivalled status. But this situation is unlikely to last beyond the 10-15 year horizon. 
Table 4: The incumbent and the challengers: state of play in 2011
US dollar Euro Renminbi
Size 27% of world GDP, 20% of world GDP, 7.6% of world GDP, 
decreasing decreasing (but potential increasing
for enlargement)
Financial markets and Unrivalled liquidity and Second after the US, but Underdeveloped markets 
openness depth, full capital mobility bond markets remain and restricted capital 
fragmented in the mobility
absence of unified 
Eurobonds. Full 
capital mobility
Legal system Strong Strong Weak
Budgetary and Increasing concerns over Strong monetary record Strong fiscal position. 
monetary policy the sustainability of and institutional Good monetary policy 
budgetary policy and the independence. Concerns rack record but at risk, 
risks of debt monetisation over solvency of some in part because of 
individual state borrowers currency peg
Ability /willingness of Strong Strong for central bank Strong
policy system to but broader capacity 
respond to unexpected limited by institutional 
shocks, LLR* function arrangements
Stance towards Incumbent Officially neutral. Support for early steps of 
international currency Unilateral euroisation by RMB internationalisation
role non-member countries 
actively discouraged
Political cohesion and Strong Limited by political Strong and in ascendance
geopolitical power fragmentation
Note: * Lender of last resort.
4.3 Global financial conditions 
Global ﬁnancial conditions and the international monetary regime are closely linked,
in at least three ways. First, following Mundell’s ‘Impossible Trinity’, a regime of free
capital mobility is not compatible with an IMS based on ﬁxed exchange rates. Second,
the IMS is partly shaped by the direction of capital ﬂows that in turn depend on macro-
and microeconomic factors, such as differences in demography and development
level, ﬁnancial technology, wealth, and the appetite of asset-holders for diversiﬁcation.
Third, there is ample evidence that ﬁnancial and monetary crises are intimately related,
the causality running both ways.
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Financial openness
The last quarter of century has been characterised by the movement of all advanced
countries and a subset of emerging countries to free capital mobility (see Box 4.1). As
a consequence, gross capital ﬂows and bilateral cross-border asset-holdings among
these countries have grown considerably: by 2005, two-way asset-holdings between
the UK and either the US, Germany or France each amounted to more than 20 percent
of the cumulated GDPs of the partner countries (see Figure 3). These advanced
countries are thus dominant in ﬁnancial networks. However, a few key ﬁnancial centres
in emerging countries – ﬁrst and foremost Hong Kong and Singapore, but also Korea
and China and, to a lesser extent, the major Latin American countries and India – were
also involved in this global network. 
A major question for the future is whether the trend towards integration will continue
and lead to the full inclusion of emerging countries into the global ﬁnancial network.
As discussed in Box 4.1, the appetite for unfettered liberalisation has signiﬁcantly
diminished in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian crisis and of the 2008-09 global crisis. An
increasing number of emerging economies have reintroduced capital controls or are
contemplating such a move. The resumption of capital ﬂows after the crisis neverthe -
less suggests that these controls are more defensive than offensive; they convey a
more cautious approach to liberalisation by emerging and developing countries rather
than a U-turn on global ﬁnancial integration. This is compatible with the strengthening
of a few key ﬁnancial centres in the major economic regions, but also with continued
threats to conventionally ﬁxed exchange-rate regimes.
Figure 3: International financial networks, 2005
Source: Kubelec and Sá (2010). Links are given by the sum of bilateral assets and liabilities divided by the sum of the
GDPs of the source and host countries. The size of the nodes is proportional to the country’s financial openness,
measured by the sum of its total external assets and liabilities.
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Direction of capital ﬂows
Another, largely independent, question is what will be the direction of net savings. A
striking characteristic of the last decade is that, in net terms, while private capital has
been ﬂowing ‘downhill’, from relatively richer to relatively poorer countries, oﬃcial
reserve hoarding has reversed the direction of total net ﬂows ‘uphill’. Although they
abated somewhat in the aftermath of the global crisis, there are reasons to believe that
‘South-North’ capital ﬂows are going to remain strong. First, projections for the short run
(eg for the IMF’s World Economic Outlook) suggest a stabilisation of global imbalances
around their post-crisis level, with net savings by China and oil producers representing
about 1.5 per cent of world GDP. Second, higher oil prices should lead in the medium
term to a further transfer of net savings from oil producers to oil importers32. Third,
projections suggest that in the coming two decades the share of high savers (the 45-
32. See Chapter 3 of the April 2011 World Economic Outlook.
0.3-3%
3-20%
>20%
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BOX 4.1 Financial openness and its discontents
The literature on capital controls and ﬁnancial liberalisation is particularly proliﬁc
but is also remarkably politicised. Although the literature was overall somewhat
inconclusive on the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial liberalisation (see the reappraisal by Kose
et al, 2009), the international ﬁnancial community and in particular the IMF worked
over the years to forge a consensus on the merits of ﬁnancial globalisation. In
particular, despite criticism (Bhagwati, 1998), free capital mobility grew to be
understood as the ﬂipside of free trade. In the late 1990s, a movement took hold to
modify the Fund’s articles along the lines of Article 8 which prescribes the opening
up of the current account. This led to a relatively activist policy from the IMF to
promote what was then called ‘orderly capital account openness’. 
In October 1997 the Fund’s Annual Meeting was held in Hong Kong as the Asian
crisis started to unwind, exposing some of the shortcomings of ﬁnancial
liberalisation. Yet there seemed to be little doubt (Fisher, 1997) that the amend -
ment of the Article of Agreement would be completed regardless. But the severity
of the Asian crisis and the reluctance of the US Congress to hand more authority to
the Fund overlooked the amendment venture and, to this day, capital controls
remain a national preroga tive over which the IMF has little authority outside of its
surveillance mission. 
Measuring capital-account openness in fact remains technically diﬃcult. Alesina,
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1993), augmented in Grilli and Milesi-Ferreti (1995), pro -
posed the ﬁrst ﬁnancial integration index, relying essentially on the IMF’s Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) which still
remains an essential sourcebook for this body of work. Chinn and Ito (2008) con -
structed one of the most often-cited indexes using a set of four binary variables based
on the AREAER. The AREAER database itself was enhanced in 1997 allowing a new
body of work to ﬂourish (see Mody and Murshid, 2005; Miniane, 2004; Schindler,
2009; Brune and Guisinger, 2006, building on Johnston and Tamirisa, 1998). 
This empirical literature highlights a few important features of ﬁnancial globalisation
beyond that of its fairly intuitive proliferation through the 1990s, in particular the
extent to which ﬁnancial liberalisation progressed in Europe through the EU single
market and the creation of the monetary union while it was stagnant in the Middle
East and Africa or even declined in Asia following the Asian crisis (Figure 4). 
However this literature focuses on de jure controls and ignores whether those
controls are actually enforced and the extent to which ﬁnancial openness did
actually occur despite those controls. Work on capital ﬂows and nations’ balance
sheets has gone beyond de-jure openness and looked at de-facto openness. An
ambitious dataset by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) has helped to clarify this and
shown that ﬁnancial globalisation has actually been even more prominent than the
literature on de-jure controls suggest (Figure 5).
Figure 4: De jure indices of financial openness, 1995-2005
Schindler (2009) disaggregated index of de jure restrictions on inflows and outflows.
Note: Schindler’s index of financial restrictiveness (here presented as financial openness) is calculated as the
average of binary variables indicating the existence of restrictions on 13 types of capital-account operations
(ingoing and outgoing). 
The most recent literature on ﬁnancial globalisation accounts for a couple of decades
of acute ﬁnancial instability (Mexico 1995, Asia 1997, Russia 1998, central Europe
2009), and of nascent doubts about the very fact that the main challenge facing
developing and emerging economies would be ﬁnancial constraints when
institutions seem to be playing such a crucial role in economic development (Rodrik,
1997). Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007) suggested that ﬁnancial integration
increased volatility. Rodrik and Subramaniam (2008) have initiated a proper attack
on the dogma and syllogism that they say led to the advent of ﬁnancial globalisation.
More recent events suggest that large, relatively ﬁnancially closed economies (such
as China and India) have achieved superior economic performance while preserving
ﬁnancial stability. Recent work by the IMF has taken the recent facts and literature
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on board by suggesting that capital controls were a legitimate macroprudential tool
in some speciﬁc cases (Ostry et al, 2010) although with the caveat that there needs
to be a framework in place to govern and coordinate them (Ostry et al, 2011).
Figure 5: De-facto indices of financial openness, 1970-2007
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2009) and authors’ calculations. Note: Western Europe on right axis.
Yet, reaching a consensus on capital controls is diﬃcult. On the one hand, allowing for
capital controls opens the door to legitimising existing distortions and creating new
ones in the international ﬁnancial system. On the other hand, emerging economies
are keen to keep what they consider a national prerogative. They argue that a compre -
hensive approach should in fact focus as much on capital recipients and their controls
as on the policies in advanced economies that make those ﬂows possible.
The next intellectual and policy challenge is therefore not so much to make capital
controls intellectually acceptable, since we seem bound to live with them, but rather
to make them practically operational in an effective and coordinated inter national
framework to avoid possible negative externalities associated with unco operative
implementation. What is more dangerous to the world economy and to the
international monetary architecture is the coexistence of two self-referencing and
competing frameworks governing capital ﬂows: one based on free-ﬂoating currency
regimes and free movement of capital, the other based on managed exchange rates
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69 age bracket) in total population is set to increase sharply in the developing and
emerging countries while it will remain stable or start to decline in the advanced
countries33. Saving in the ‘south’ should therefore increase relative to advanced
economies even if from a low base. Fourth, judging from IMF data, the average
investment rate in emerging and developing countries is already at a historically high
level, which suggests it is unlikely to rise much further34. We therefore posit that the
world saving-investment balance pattern is not going to reverse dramatically over the
next 10-15 years. 
Financial instability
The 2007-09 ﬁnancial crisis made clear the importance of the key currency of the IMS
being supported by a strong ﬁnancial safety net, which in this case took the form of
generous domestic and selective cross-border liquidity provision by the Federal
Reserve. The decisions taken by the G20 (SDR allocation, tripling of IMF resources,
new liquidity lines provided by the Fund) have also demonstrated how international
cooperation can help take swift action when necessary. However the jury is still out on
the relative ability of a single country and of the international community to cushion
major liquidity droughts. This is likely to remain true in the future, given in particular the
major shifts in the global economy outlined in section 4.1. 
The jury is also out on the ability of the international community to cooperate on
ﬁnancial regulation and supervision, as well as on macroeconomic policies. Assuming
such cooperation fails, it is diﬃcult to imagine how a multilateral solution to IMS ﬂaws
could emerge. It should be recalled here that currencies are ultimately backed by ﬁscal
authorities, the latter being the ultimate backstop of systemically important ﬁnancial
institutions.
Summing up, although the ﬁnancial crisis has shifted attention to the resilience of the
ﬁnancial system, we do not consider it necessary to take as an assumption that the
world economy is poised to experience any major discontinuity in the pattern of global
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and incomplete capital movement. Reconciling those two worlds (which both
account for roughly half of the world’s population and soon half of its economic
output) into one internationally coherent monetary system governing global capital
ﬂows is the intellectual and policy challenge of our time.
33. Source: simulation with the INGENUE model of CEPII, OFCE and CEPREMAP. 
34 Although investment in the Asian newly-industrialised countries never really recovered from the Asian crisis. 
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ﬁnancial integration, whereas the jury is still out on the effectiveness of enhanced
international cooperation in the future. This, therefore, needs to be a key area for the
reform of the IMS.
4.4 The changing template of monetary and exchange-rate policies 
In the 1990s and the 2000s there was a remarkable degree of policy consensus
among advanced and some emerging countries (with the notable exception of China
and Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries) on the institutional set-ups and the
mandates of central banks. It seemed that the so-called ﬂexible inﬂation-targeting
regime (whereby the central bank aims to stabilise consumer-price inﬂation around its
target, but also at minimise the output gap) under ﬂoating exchange rates or broadly
similar strategies could provide for a wide array of countries the right mix of internal and
external stability. Extrapolating from the success of this scheme, Rose (2007)
developed the view that it provided a template for an international monetary regime
‘without a central role for the US, gold or the IMF’. 
The popularity of inﬂation-targeting could indeed be regarded as the triumph of the
‘own house-in-order’ doctrine in the international monetary ﬁeld. International stability
would be achieved as a simple sum of domestic stability. This bottom-up approach
made traditional approaches look passé.
There were, however, more than a few problems with this view. To start with, con -
vergence on the inﬂation-targeting ﬂexible-exchange template would eliminate some
issues – such as the relative role of global currencies as anchor currencies or the
accumulation of reserves for mercantilist purposes – but not all. It would not, for
example, eliminate the asymmetry between safe-asset issuers and safe-asset
investors, and the externalities associated with the use of a national currency as
international vehicle currency. Furthermore, correcting the present system to make it
a ‘pure’ free-ﬂoating regime with domestic, inﬂation targeting-type monetary anchors
would not solve the major issue of liquidity provision to countries facing sudden capital
outﬂows. 
Second, at the time of the crisis convergence on the free-ﬂoating template was far from
overwhelming, as indicated by Figure 6: if anything, the share of countries under a
ﬂexible exchange-rate regime in world GDP and even more in world exports was
declining. This was in no small part due to the growing weight of China and East Asian
countries. 
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Figure 6: Shares of countries under alternative exchange-rate regimes in world
exports and world GDP, 1980-2007
Source: Authors’ calculations on the basis of the Ilzeztki-Reinhart-Rogoff classification. Euro-area countries are
treated separately throughout in order not to introduce a break in the series. 
Third, since the crisis the inﬂation-targeting model has been under attack for having led
to neglect of ﬁnancial stability. Monetary policy post crisis is in a state of ﬂux and a
template that commands consensus within the central banking community no longer
exists. Some advocate a ‘leaning-into-the-wind’ approach whereby interest-rate setting
by the central bank takes into account concerns over ﬁnancial stability, while others
advocate complementing inﬂation-targeting through recourse to a macroprudential
instrument (see Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010). In the process, the simplicity
and uniformity of the pre-crisis template risks being lost. 
Fourth, the inﬂation-targeting template assumes away spillover consequences from
national monetary policies through carry trade and other forms of capital inﬂows which
have recently raised alarm in emerging countries. 
Lastly, the move to a less benign environment, in which worldwide resource scarcity
results in regular inﬂation upsurges, raises major questions for a template that focuses
on domestically generated inﬂation and neglects spillover effects through global
commodity prices. 
Summing up, both the crisis and changes in the global environment are prompting
questions and reﬂections on the appropriate policy response at national and
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international levels. This makes the reference to an intellectually coherent, but
simplifying, model less adequate and suggests that international monetary discussion
needs to take on board a series of new questions. 
56
5 Assessment of alternative
regimes
Assessing international monetary regimes is an especially diﬃcult task. One reason
for this is that, by deﬁnition, such a regime covers the whole world. Thus, there are few
historical examples of regime change; hence there are few opportunities to compare
performance. Another reason is that an international monetary regime is rarely as pure
as in the textbooks. For instance, not all of the world’s currencies were pegged to the
dollar under the Bretton Woods system. As for the present regime, it combines ﬂoating
regimes, pegs to the US dollar and regional arrangements. 
Research has therefore to rely on the observed performance of a small number of
hybrid systems, each of which is diﬃcult to evaluate. Claims that the world would have
performed better with a different monetary system are typically irrefutable, so any
assessment will necessarily be tentative. Here we start by deﬁning three basic
scenarios for the future and by discussing their likelihood (section 5.1). We thereafter
move to a normative assessment of the pros and cons of alternative regimes on the
basis of criteria inspired by the Musgravian analysis of public ﬁnances (section 5.2). 
5.1 Three scenarios for the next decade
Based on the analysis in the previous sections, we postulate three scenarios for the
future evolution of the IMS over a period of 10 to 15 years. These scenarios are
intended to map out possible evolutions but they clearly do not exhaust the range of
possible outcomes. They can actually provide a basis for building a wider range of
hybrid scenarios.
Scenario 1: Repair and improve 
Our ﬁrst scenario assumes the continuation of current policy efforts to improve the
functioning of the system through incremental reforms. We posit that the IMS remains
organised around the US dollar but that attempts are made to correct its major ﬂaws
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within the framework of existing institutions and with the help of existing instruments.
As discussed elsewhere in this report, efforts so far – be they to build consensus on
exchange-rate regimes and the management of capital inﬂows, create ﬁnancial safety
nets or strengthen surveillance – are not negligible. In view of the limited achievements
of the surveillance process launched at the Pittsburgh summit, it is hard to imagine
that gradualism will deliver a breakthrough but it is reasonable to expect some progress
on the basis of the momentum created by the crisis response and the institutionalisa -
tion of G20 summits. 
The key assumptions for the scenario are:
• The global monetary order remains based on the predominance of national or
regional choices: there is no major shift in the distribution of competences between
national and supranational institutions. 
• The US dollar retains its present role in the system (which, in turn, supposes that the
sustainability of US ﬁscal policy is not considered at risk). The euro’s role remains
broadly constant, or possibly declines following lasting effects of the euro-area
sovereign debt crisis.
• China gradually aligns its monetary regime on those of other Asian emerging
countries, which can be characterised by ‘dirty’ ﬂoat and a limited use of capital
controls. Building on its experience with the creation of an offshore market for the
renminbi, it continues to foster the international role of its currency, but at a gradual
pace.
• Incremental steps are taken to further reinforce ﬁnancial safety nets at multilateral
level. This may take the form of the strengthening of IMF low-conditionality facilities
for countercyclical purposes, of enhanced cooperation between multilateral and
regional schemes, or of more predictable bilateral swap agreements between
central banks. More frequent SDR allocations are also possible, though not likely.
• Because few emerging countries are on a pure free-ﬂoat regime, and because their
trust in multilateral, regional and bilateral ﬁnancial safety nets remains limited,
reserve accumulation remains widespread.
• Multilateral surveillance is improved and reformed to involve a broader range of
policies, including capital controls. Political endorsement of IMF surveillance by the
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G20 is improved, strengthening policy coordination. However surveillance and
coordination processes remain non-binding35.
Although it involves considerable continuity with the current state of affairs, scenario
1 should not be regarded as a status-quo scenario. It is based on cautious assumptions
but nevertheless assumes progress along the road opened up in the aftermath of the
global crisis. 
Scenario 2: Move towards multipolarity
Our second scenario envisages a more signiﬁcant change in world monetary geo -
graphy. In this scenario we posit that the US dollar remains the main key inter national
currency, but that the euro and the renminbi also play a key role in the IMS – as reserve
currencies, anchor currencies and on international markets for goods and assets. 
Unlike scenario 1, which is essentially policy driven, scenario 2 can be regarded as
driven by a combination of policy and market forces. As indicated in the previous
section, we consider it likely that the world economy will develop in the direction of
growing multipolarity, and we regard scenario 2 as congruent with this pattern of
economic evolution. Of course, a number of policy decisions are required for this to
materialise. But assuming these decisions are taken, market forces are likely to
contribute to the emergence of scenario 2. 
The key assumptions behind this scenario are that the euro area and China both move
in a direction that leads to the emergence of their currencies as partial substitutes for
the US dollar. 
For the euro area, this requires ﬁrst and foremost overcoming uncertainties sur -
rounding sovereign risk and economic governance. We assume that the euro-area
authorities effectively foster the euro’s international role by enacting economic reforms
(in the direction of a strengthening of economic integration), ﬁnancial reforms (such
as more effective and centralised supervision or the creation of a reference ﬁxed-
income asset at euro area level) and policy reforms (more effective governance,
streamlined external representation, enhanced monetary cooperation with neigh -
bouring countries). Not all these reforms are needed for the euro to play a more
meaningful international role, but a critical mass is certainly required to convince
investors worldwide that they can rely on the future of the European currency.
35. We assume that surveillance does not reach the effectiveness envisaged by Truman (2010). 
GLOBAL CURRENCIES FOR TOMORROW: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE
59
36. The policy implications for the euro area are spelled out in more detail in section 7. 
37. See Vallée (2011) for a review of the arguments.
Enlargement would also help broaden the economic base for the euro and buck the
trend towards relative decline. Over a 10-15-year period, there is signiﬁcant potential
for this among the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and, over a longer
term, in the rest of Europe36.
We posit China moving at a sustained pace towards the internationalisation of its
currency. Changes are initially gradual (for example, we suppose an extension of
the ‘pilot’ project of renminbi internationalisation launched in 2009, the promotion
of one or several active financial centres and initiatives towards increased financial
account openness), but they create momentum and trigger enough two-way capital
mobility for an internationalisation of the renminbi to take place despite the con -
tinuation of current-account surpluses, still-existing limitations to capital mobility
(see Vallée, 2011, for details on recent Chinese initiatives and their potential). Such
moves would probably enable the renminbi to reach a level of international usage
equal or perhaps superior to that of the yen at the turn of the millennium or of the
Swiss franc.
The more diﬃcult question is under what conditions the renminbi can achieve the
status of third or second international currency. It is often argued that, short of full
capital mobility and a freely ﬂoating exchange rate, a currency cannot attain an
international status37. We disagree with the strict formulation of this view: the renminbi
may achieve signiﬁcant international status before China’s ﬁnancial account has been
fully opened up, and a free ﬂoating currency is not a precondition either. However,
reaching the end-point where the renminbi is on an equal footing with the dollar, will
require a clean break. Given the dynamics of currency reforms under way, we posit
that over a 15-year period the renminbi can be a ﬂoating currency underpinned by
fairly complete capital mobility. 
We do not make any particular assumption about the US. Clearly, the diversiﬁcation of
public and private dollar holdings would be encouraged by lasting diﬃculties in the
United States in adjusting its public ﬁnances (in this case, an abrupt diversiﬁcation
accelerating the switch to multipolarity following a dollar crisis cannot be excluded).
But this is not a necessary assumption. 
An important question is how non-dominant monetary players would behave, should
a few international currencies emerge. We do not envisage a partition of some sort into
regional blocks. We think it is likely that some countries will join regional monetary
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arrangements or peg their currency to the regional hegemon; but others will ﬂoat freely
or adopt dirty ﬂoats with reference to ad-hoc baskets, while developing their local-
currency ﬁnancial markets. So there could be signiﬁcant heterogeneity across
countries, and an enhanced role played by non-core currencies, with adequate
development of local-currency ﬁnancial markets. 
Other features of the scenario (ﬁnancial safety nets, capital controls, surveillance)
would basically be the same as in scenario 1. However there would be less reserve
accumulation by China, because it would be in a ﬂoating regime, and by countries that
would choose to take part in formal regional arrangements. There would also be more
diversiﬁcation of oﬃcial reserves worldwide.
Finally, variants of scenario 2 in which only one currency develops as a substitute for
the US dollar can be considered. In particular, there is a scenario in which only the
renminbi develops as an international currency, whereas the euro is held back by
lasting uncertainties over governance and the management of sovereign risks, the
lack of willingness of the European authorities to internationalise the currency and the
relatively low dynamism of the euro-area economy. We label as scenario 2a this
bipolar, US dollar-renminbi scenario.
Scenario 3: Renewed multilateralism 
Our third scenario envisages renewed, possibly crisis-led, momentum towards
international monetary cooperation that would result in the building of a multilateral
monetary order, where assets denominated in a non-national currency or quasi-
currency would develop and the provision of global liquidity would be steered by the
centre while agreed rules would determine, or at least strongly inﬂuence, the sharing
of the burden of international macroeconomic and monetary adjustment. 
Blueprints for such systems have been on offer at least since the demise of the Bretton
Woods order. The idea has been revived in recent contributions by the Stiglitz United
Nations Commission (2009) and, in a more allusive way, by the IMF (Mateos y Lago et
al, 2009) and the Palais-Royal report (Camdessus et al, 2011). We do not consider an
evolution of this sort likely, because we do not see much room for acceptance of
stronger international institutions and tighter international discipline. Even initiatives
by the G20 summit, admittedly a signiﬁcant step forward in the direction of co -
ordination, have been characterised by intergovernmentalism and a refusal to delegate
power to supranational bodies. But it is useful to map out a multilateral scenario and
to compare it to the others (Table 5). 
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38. Truman (2011) proposes a series of such mechanisms. 
The starting point for scenario 3 is that neither the renminbi nor the euro emerge as
major international currencies and that the need for diversifying oﬃcial and private
reserves is met by the development of the SDR. This requires that international
ﬁnancial institutions, but also national governments and, later, multinational ﬁrms,
issue debt denominated in SDR so that there is a suﬃcient supply of such assets to
meet the demand for liquid, riskless assets. Market infrastructures are also gradually
organised to support SDR trades, and hedging products are eventually developed.
Accordingly, the SDR is increasingly used as an invoicing currency for commodities,
energy and carbon markets and emerging countries gradually move to using the SDR
rather than the dollar or the euro as an anchor currency. Oﬃcial reserves are
progressively converted into SDRs, possibly with the help of a ‘substitution account’
at the IMF.
The emergence of the SDR as a widely used quasi-currency would favour the
strengthening of multilateral ﬁnancial safety nets as the IMF would have better access
to SDR ﬁnancings in case of necessity. 
The building of a multilateral order would also require a strengthening of multilateral
surveillance over and above what is envisaged in the other two scenarios. The
arrangement considered here does not imply an ‘outside currency’ in a proper sense,
such as Keynes’ bancor, which would guarantee, at least theoretically, a fully
symmetrical adjustment mechanism and a full control of global reserves. We regard
such a scheme unrealistic under present conditions (though it could be the eventual
solution, also according to the IMF Articles of Agreement; see Padoa-Schioppa, 2010).
We postulate instead a strengthening of the SDR, which can be viewed as a ‘quasi-
currency’, and a parallel strengthening of multilateral surveillance through the setting
of agreed policy principles and the creation of effective enforcement mechanisms38.
This hypothesis alone is bold enough in view of the almost-exclusive focus by
policymakers in the major countries on domestic issues which results in the strong
reluctance to submit their domestic choices to international disciplines. 
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Table 5: Main features of the scenarios
Current regime Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
(repair – improve) (multipolarity) (multilateralism)
Main international USD USD USD, EUR, USD, SDR
(quasi-) currency(ies) RMB*
Other currencies Mainly floating, Move towards Pegs to regional SDR gradually 
but pegs on USD greater flexibility hegemons, emerges as main 
widespread de flexibility between anchor
jure or de facto hegemons
Financial account Incomplete and Incomplete and Opening up of Coordinated and 
liberalisation uneven in EMs uneven in EMs China gradual
Local-currency Limited Yes Yes Yes
financial markets in 
EMs
Financial safety nets Perceived as Somewhat Strengthened Strengthened
unreliable strengthened based on existing based on existing 
based on existing instruments and instruments and 
instruments inclusion of RMB further
in SDR development of SDR
Reserve accumulation Motivated by self- Somewhat less Less scope for Less scope for 
insurance and scope for self- self-insurance and self-insurance, 
exchange-rate insurance exchange-rate better
management management, diversification
purposes better 
diversification
Surveillance and Weak Improved by Improved by Improved by 
coordination inclusion of inclusion of inclusion of 
capital controls in capital controls in capital controls in 
surveillance and surveillance and surveillance, 
better better better
endorsement at endorsement at endorsement at 
political level political level political level and 
central bank 
coordination on 
global liquidity
* USD, RMB only in scenario 2a.
A major issue in any scheme of this sort is the determination of the global monetary
stance. Clearly, no system can be envisaged in which there would be an additional
centre of independent liquidity creation in addition to national central banks. Therefore,
central banks should cooperate in the management of global liquidity. In case of
excess liquidity worldwide, they would tighten their cross-border liquidity provision
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schemes and recommend the IMF to withdraw SDR allocations and to reduce SDR bond
issuance; in the case of liquidity shortage they would proceed symmetrically. More
generally, this scenario relies on a major strengthening of international institutions
and governance.
Before assessing these different scenarios, we need to discuss their respective
likelihood and their interconnection: are these scenarios substitutes, sequential or
complementary? How can they be hybridised?
Likelihood 
The ﬁrst scenario is the least demanding in terms of both domestic policies and
international coordination, since it ‘only’ requires the G20 to carry on with coordination
and foster progress on ﬁnancial safety nets, and the United States to reassure the rest
of the world about its ﬁscal sustainability. Hence it is the most likely in the short term.
In contrast, the third scenario requires an exceptional amount of policy cooperation.
Such cooperation is not on offer today but could emerge at a later stage, for instance
after a deep dollar crisis or a major rift over exchange rates. The second scenario relies
on market forces and domestic policies rather than international cooperation. Its
probability is low in the short run, but signiﬁcant over 10-15 years. 
One should not neglect small-probability events that could have far-reaching conse -
quences for the IMS, for example a sovereign debt crisis in the US, or debt monetisation
on a large scale (or expectations of such developments). This could suddenly
accelerate the move from the current system or scenario 1 to either scenario 2 or 3.
Similarly, an aggravation of the crisis in the euro area, or its mere perpetuation,
eventually leading to a partial break-up, could cancel out any prospect of further
development of the euro as an international currency. Finally, the Chinese economy
and economic policy have not yet proved their resilience in an open and deregulated
landscape. For instance, the ability of the People’s Bank of China to manage the
inﬂation rate and of the Chinese ﬁnancial system to ﬁnance the economy has not yet
been tested within a western-type system. More generally, the present willingness of
the Chinese authorities to move towards currency internationalisation may at some
point be halted by internal diﬃculties in achieving ﬁnancial stability.
Sequencing
Since the most likely scenario in the short term is the ﬁrst (not counting the status
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39. The same could apply to scenario 2. Once the international currency status is more evenly shared across the world
and local-currency markets have developed, scenario 3 might appear less as a direct threat to the dollar and more
as a way to improve the functioning of the IMS. Furthermore, the incentives to cooperate might become more
symmetrical.
quo), and since scenarios 2 and 3 include various features of scenario 1, scenario 1
can be viewed as a ﬁrst step towards either scenario 2 or 3. Indeed, developments
along the lines of scenario 1 would raise the likelihood of the advent of either scenario
2 or 3:
• Scenario 1 can pave the way for scenario 2 through the development of local-
currency ﬁnancial markets, the extension of exchange-rate ﬂexibility and the
reduced motivation for reserve accumulation. Indeed, looser links with the US dollar
and lower fears of being plagued with a liquidity shortage could favour the
diversiﬁcation of foreign-exchange reserves and the shift of monetary anchors
towards more regional concerns.
• Scenario 1 can however also pave the way for scenario 3, since it already includes
some improvements of the multilateral system, based on existing instruments39.
However, scenarios 2 and 3 can also be achieved directly from the status quo. One
possibility would be an abrupt shift following another major ﬁnancial crisis that would
undermine the central role of the US dollar in the monetary system. Another possibility
would be that market forces and domestic policy decisions are strong enough to
promote scenario 2, even without any accompanying coordination at the multilateral
level. This possibility of a smooth transition from the current system directly to a very
different one is less likely in the case of scenario 3. Indeed, if the appetite for
coordination is not strong enough to improve on the current system based on existing
instruments, there is little chance that it will be strong enough to design new, more
ambitious coordination instruments. Figure 7 summarises the possible sequencing
of the different scenarios.
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Figure 7: Sequencing of the three scenarios
Note: solid lines represent the possible transitions through scenario 1; dotted lines represent direct transitions from
the status quo to scenarios 2 and 3.
Hybridisation
Scenarios 2 and 3 should be viewed as substitutes rather than complements. However,
this does not mean that some elements of multilateralism could not be introduced in
scenario 2. For instance, the management of global liquidity could be carried out
through appropriate coordination between the key central banks of a multipolar world.
Reciprocally, some elements of multipolarity, such as the inclusion of the renminbi
and possibly other currencies in the SDR, could easily be imagined within scenario 3.
Hybridisation could also take place along a geographic divide. For instance, a number
of emerging countries could increasingly rely on the SDR for monetary anchoring and
reserve managements, the multipolar game being limited to two or three big players
and a number of smaller regional satellites.
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40. The cost of oﬃcial reserves results from the spread between their remuneration and that of alternative investments.
As argued by Landau (2009), individual countries, however, do not internalise the total cost of reserves, which
includes the cost of global imbalances and subsequent crises.
5.2 Assessing the scenarios: criteria
In this section, we propose an assessment of the three scenarios for the global
economy as a whole. To be the issuer of an international currency also involves
beneﬁts and costs that are speciﬁc to the issuing countries or zones. These beneﬁts
and costs are discussed for the euro area in section 7.1.
To assess the three scenarios deﬁned above, it is necessary to rely on a set of generally
accepted criteria. The most universal criteria for assessing economic policy are the
eﬃciency, stability and equity triad of Musgrave and Musgrave (1989). Their
application to the assessment of monetary regimes is straightforward. 
Eﬃciency 
Eﬃciency criteria relate to the long- or medium-term consequences of alternative
arrangements. 
• Economies of scale: To serve eﬃciently as a means of payment, international
currencies should be limited in number (to minimise transaction and information
costs); and they should be the currencies of large countries or areas (so that the
currencies are already used by a large number of agents). 
• Savings on reserve accumulation: The system should minimise the need to build up
costly oﬃcial reserves40. It should favour an eﬃcient allocation of capital worldwide:
it should be consistent with savings ﬂowing in line with differentials in the marginal
productivity of capital after taking into account limiting factors (eg political risk) and
return volatility. 
• Limitation of exchange-rate misalignments: The system should also avoid large
misalignments of real exchange rates with their fundamentals, to avoid resource
misallocation both internally (between traded and non-traded goods sectors), and
internationally (arising from price distortions). 
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41. We do not enter here the well-known discussion about whether other forms of bubbles affecting stock markets or
commodities can be avoided through appropriate monetary policy. The discussion on this issue is essentially the
same at national and at global levels.
42. The precise meaning of ‘excessive imbalances’ and ‘unsustainable net foreign-asset positions’ is obviously a matter
for discussion. Again, this applies to all international monetary systems. We do not claim to have a yardstick to
determine what external balances should be, we only claim that it belongs to the international monetary system
to provide incentives for appropriate balances.
Stability
A major lesson from the crisis is that ﬁnancial stability is a public good that should be
sought by governments individually as well as collectively, while minimising the
associated eﬃciency costs. The international monetary system has a key role to play
in this respect, both in avoiding the build-up of imbalances and in mitigating the impact
of crises. The key issues here are:
• Global anchor: Crisis prevention should include the provision of a global anchor, so
that monetary policies are geared towards global stability and reduce the risks of
worldwide credit bubbles or deﬂation41. This essentially boils down to avoiding
situations of excess or too little liquidity at global level. 
• Discipline: The IMS should also provide incentives to all governments to conduct
policies consistent with the avoidance of excessive imbalances and the build-up
of large, unsustainable net foreign-asset positions42. 
• Resilience to shocks: Crisis mitigation involves ensuring resilience when confronted
with major economic and ﬁnancial shocks, such as sudden capital surges and stops.
What can be expected from the international monetary system is that it leaves
suﬃcient autonomy to governments and central banks to respond with national
policy instruments and that it ensures the provision of international liquidity when
necessary. 
• Limitation of exchange-rate volatility: A ﬁnal aspects of stability is to ensure that
exchange-rate volatility remains limited and/or manageable (through the
development of affordable hedging instruments, which requires deep foreign-
exchange markets). It is also desirable that the system prevents or limits adverse
spillover effects, such as when a shock to country A has destabilising effects on
the exchange rate between countries B and C. By the same token the system should
discourage and, if necessary, punish beggar-thy-neighbour policies, including
‘currency wars’ in situations of global demand shortage. 
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Equity 
• Adjustment symmetry: The system should ensure the symmetry of adjustments, so
that balance-of-payment adjustments do not fall only on a speciﬁc category of
countries (deﬁcit countries whose currency has no international status). 
• Limitation of exorbitant privilege: Equally, it should avoid granting one country the
‘exorbitant privilege’ of being relieved of international constraints, unless these are
the counterpart of corresponding duties. 
• Distribution of global seignorage revenue: In a more equal system seignorage
arising from the global use of currencies should be shared. 
• Limitation of policy spillovers: Finally, the IMS should either allow for a coordinated
policy response to shocks, or for a minimisation of international spillover effects of
domestic policies.
5.3 Assessing the scenarios: comparison of alternative regimes
Table 6 summarises our assessment of the three scenarios on the basis of our set of
criteria, taking the current system as a benchmark. The table also includes a reminder
of their feasibility (on the basis of section 5.1). 
A ﬁrst glance at the table suggests that (i) any scenario would offer improvements
compared to the current situation, (ii) the feasibility of the scenarios seems negatively
correlated to their desirability, at least in the short run, and (iii) the multipolar and the
multilateral scenarios both seem superior to the more modest ‘repair-and-improve’
scenario, although their pros and cons vary across the different criteria. We now detail
the assessment for each criterion.
Eﬃciency
• Economies of scale: This ﬁrst criterion is the most straightforward, since more key
currencies necessarily involve a loss in terms of transaction and information costs.
This criterion is detrimental to the multipolar scenario, although it should be borne
in mind that transaction costs are already very low between existing key currencies
(especially between the dollar and the euro, and between the dollar and the yen).
Should the SDR play a prominent role as a means of payment, this ﬁrst criterion
would also involve, in the long term, a loss for the multilateral scenario.
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• Reserve accumulation: The ﬁrst scenario, which offers improvements on ﬁnancial
safety nets, encourages exchange-rate ﬂexibility and provides more surveillance,
would reduce, although not eliminate, the incentive for emerging countries to
accumulate large reserves. Since these features are also presents in scenarios 2
and 3, any of these scenarios would represent improvements as far as the reserve
criterion is concerned. By providing further strengthening of the multilateral scheme
for liquidity provision, scenario 3 would further reduce the scope for reserve
accumulation. As for scenario 2, it would reduce reserve accumulation by the most
active country in this regard, namely China. Finally, both scenarios 2 and 3 would
allow for better diversiﬁcation of oﬃcial reserves, hence a better risk-return proﬁle.
• Exchange-rate misalignments: With smaller reserve accumulation and more
exchange-rate ﬂexibility around the world, real exchange-rates would more quickly
reﬂect changes in economic fundamentals, hence scenario 1 would yield an
improvement compared to the current regime. The improvement would be greater
with a multipolar regime since each key currency would bear its share of real
exchange-rate adjustments, and the scope for long-lasting misalignments would
be limited to smaller currencies. In the case of a multilateral system, the scope for
misalignments would also be limited due to more symmetrical pegging behaviours
(based on the SDR).
Stability
• Global anchor: Only scenario 3 addresses the problem of the lack of a global anchor,
through the development of a jointly managed source of international liquidity as
well as monetary cooperation among central banks. The other scenarios do not
preclude monetary cooperation (and in an optimistic view such cooperation could
be made easier within a small group of key central bankers), but it is not logically
implied by the basic scenarios.
• Discipline: While scenario 1 relies on enhanced surveillance to improve the
discipline of macroeconomic policies, the other two scenarios directly address the
Triﬃn dilemma. In both cases, the idea is to develop an alternative source of riskless,
liquid reserve assets, to prevent the eventual deterioration of the quality of dollar-
denominated ones. Competition amongst reserve-asset issuers then can contribute
to discipline. Suppose, for instance, that the sustainability of US public ﬁnances is
under threat. Because there are alternatives to US treasury bonds, international
investors (including central banks) will switch to other assets displaying similar
levels of liquidity. This will put pressure on the US authorities to adjust, through a
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43. It can be asked if scenario 2 would enhance discipline, or just spread the Triﬃn dilemma over a group of key players
(see Mateos y Lago et al, 2009). Only a supranational currency could fully eliminate the Triﬃn dilemma (see United
Nations, 2009). However, as Eichengreen (2009) puts it, ‘The more alternatives central banks and other investors
possess, the more pressure policymakers will feel to take the steps to maintain those investors’ conﬁdence’ (p. 68).
See also remarks by Fred Bergsten (in Pisani-Ferry and Posen, 2009, p186): ‘I believe it would be healthy for the
United States to move to a bipolar monetary system where there is competition. There is no reason why the United
States and Europe could not cooperate effectively to manage a bipolar monetary system. The competition it would
promote might be a healthy element’, and sceptical comments by Larry Summers. This is consistent with an
attenuation of the Triﬃn problem. In the case of scenario 3, there would still be a risk of reducing rather than
enhancing discipline if reserve holders were no longer to hold the currency risk (the latter being socialised through
a substitution account).
higher interest rate, a lower dollar or a combination of the two43. Note that such a
stabilising property of a multipolar system is still debatable, as exempliﬁed by the
concept of ‘hegemonic stability’ (Box 5.1). On the contrary, this effect is enhanced
in scenario 3.
Table 6: An assessment of the three scenarios
Criterion Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Repair and improve Multipolarity Renewed 
multilateralism
Efficiency 
Economies of scale 0 - 0/- 
Savings on reserve accumulation + ++ +++ 
Limitation of FX misalignments + ++ ++
Stability 
Global anchor 0 ? + 
Discipline + ++ +++ 
Limitation of FX volatility 0 - - 
Resilience to shocks + + ++
Equity 
Adjustment symmetry + ++ +++ 
Limitation of exorbitant privilege 0 + ++ 
Global seignorage 0 + + 
Limitation of policy spillovers + ++ +++
Feasibility +++ ++ + 
Note: Gains (+) or losses (-) are those implied by moving from the current IMS to each of the alternative regimes.
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44. On the real effects of exchange-rate volatility and misalignments, see eg Clark et al (2004), Sallenave (2010).
• Exchange-rate volatility: The competition across reserve-asset issuers mentioned
above could also give rise to more exchange-rate volatility in scenario 2, when
compared to the current regime. This is because the allocation of liquid portfolios
would become more sensitive to changes in expected asset returns (Box 5.2). To the
extent that the SDR would be a substitute for dollar assets, the same kind of
outcome could be observed in scenario 3. It must be recalled, however, that short-
term exchange-rate volatility may not be too detrimental to the real economy since
it can easily be hedged, as opposed to long-lasting exchange-rate misalignments44.
Also and importantly, adverse spillovers onto third-country exchange rates would
likely be reduced in a more symmetrical system. For instance, the euro/dollar
exchange rate would no longer be affected by a shock affecting trade relations
between China and the United States (Bénassy-Quéré and Pisani-Ferry, 2011).
• Resilience to shocks: The strengthening of ﬁnancial safety nets assumed in
scenario 3 would presumably help improve resilience to shocks more than in the
other two scenarios.
BOX 5.1: Hegemonic stability in a unipolar system?
Scholars of international relations often point out that a unipolar system exhibits
‘hegemonic stability’ properties (see Kindelberger, 1981, or the critical assessment
by Eichengreen, 1987). The idea is rooted in the inter-war experience, a period where
‘the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and
United States unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilising it’ (Kindleberger,
1973, p292). The rationale for hegemonic stability is that the hegemon is supposed
to internalise the externalities involved in the provision of a particular global public
good – monetary stability in a broad sense, including through the provision of
liquidity in times of stress, see Table 7 – whereas none of the issuers of competing
currencies has an incentive to behave in this way. For example, the hegemon refrains
from conducting a monetary policy that has destabilising consequences for the rest
of the world. This discipline results from its global responsibilities and the corre -
sponding privileges.
A ‘leaderless’ currency system could theoretically manage to produce the global
public good, provided there is effective coordination between the different players.
However, such coordination was missing during the interwar period (Eichengreen,
1987), and is unlikely to be more effective with more than two players, all the more
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so since one player (the euro area) has not yet resolved its problem of external
representation (Cohen, 2009).
According to Cohen (2009), the major risk of monetary power fragmentation is that
of ‘formal leadership aspirations’, ie a state-driven rather than market-based leader -
ship struggle. The risk is both economic (eg increasingly antagonistic relation ships
between currency blocs, possibly leading to de-globalisation) and geopolitical (eg
a breakdown of fragile equilibria, such as oil and support for the US dollar in return
for military protection in the Middle East).
Although attractive, the ‘hegemonic stability’ theory neglects the possibility for the
hegemon to exploit its monetary power rather than internalising global stability in its
decision-making process. It does not account for the actual behaviour of past
hegemons such as the UK under the gold standard or the US in the post-war period.
True, the US often acted as a crisis coordination leader, for example at the time of the
Asian crisis, and the Federal Reserve supplied US dollars to partner central banks
through swap agreements at the time of the global crisis. But the loose monetary
policy during the Greenspan era may not have fully internalised the worldwide impact
of cheap credit. By the same token, the choice by the US Federal Reserve to embark
on quantitative easing in the aftermath of the crisis may have failed to internalise
fully the impact on emerging countries as a consequence of hot-money inﬂows.
Furthermore, the legislative branch has demonstrated markedly less willingness to
let the US play the role of the benevolent hegemon and incur the corresponding costs. 
In fact, the hegemonic stability approach starts from the assumption that the
hegemon enjoys undisputed economic predominance and therefore has an
unambiguous incentive to preserve and nurture international stability. A simple
review of the traditional functions of the monetary hegemon suggests that declining
relative size may affect a country’s ability to play that role (Table 7).
Table 7: Roles of the monetary hegemon and their current relevance
Hegemon’s role Relevance Does size matter?
Enforcer of rules of the game Yes (together with Yes
(eg exchange rates) international institutions)
Global anchor Yes Yes 
Supplier of reserve assets Yes Yes 
Crisis coordination leader Yes Yes 
Lender of last resort Together with IMF Yes 
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Hence, when the dominance of the monetary hegemon is no longer backed up by
relative size and economic power, there are grounds to question the stability to be
expected from a continuation of a unipolar monetary system. In contrast, as already
argued by Kwan in 2001: ‘The emergence of international currencies that compete
with the dollar may help impose discipline on the macroeconomic policy of the United
States by rendering the international environment less forgiving of its mistakes’ (Kwan
2001, p7). The traditional arguments in favour of a hegemonic system are therefore
weaker than they appear at ﬁrst sight. They may have provided a fair rationalisation of
the ﬁrst phase of the post-war Bretton Woods order, but fail to offer a guide for the
assessment of alternative arrangements in a radically different world situation.
BOX 5.2: Reserve-asset competition, macroeconomic discipline and 
exchange-rate volatility
A simple, three-country portfolio model helps identify what might be the conse -
quences for exchange-rate volatility of moving towards a multipolar world. 
Bénassy-Quéré and Pisani-Ferry (2011) consider a world made up of three countries
(the United States, China and the euro area), and three currencies (the dollar, the
renminbi, and the euro). US assets are assumed riskless, whereas Chinese and
European ones involve a liquidity risk. The representative investor is assumed to
maximise the expected variation of his/her utility, which is a concave function of
the variation of his/her wealth. Utility maximisation then determines the optimal
share of each type of asset in the investor’s wealth. 
It is further assumed that Chinese investors can hold the three types of assets, but
that due to Chinese capital controls, US and European investors cannot hold
renminbi-denominated assets. The model can be solved to ﬁnd out how a change in
relative returns affects the share of currency j in the portfolio of country i’s
representative investor (fji):
Dr€$US investor: f€U = ——————————
aU(s$2&s€212s€$&w€2)
Dr$€ w€2European investor: f$E = ——————————&————————
aE(s$2&s€212s€$&w€2)  s$2&s€212s€$&w€2
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s2Dr$Y1(wY2&s$2)Dr€Y&aCwY2(w€2&s€21s€$)Chinese investor: f$C = ————————————————–——
aC[s1s21(wY2&s€$)]
s1Dr€Y1(wY2&s$2)Dr$Y&aCwY2(w$21s€$)f€C = ————————————————
aC[s1s21(wY2&s€$)]
Where ai is the risk aversion of country i’s representative investor (i=U,E,C), Drii’
is the expected return differential between currencies j and j’, si2 is the risk on the
exchange rate between currency j (j=$, €) and the renminbi, wj2 is the liquidity risk
on the assets denominated in currency j, s1=wY2&s$2, and s2=wY2&s€2&w€2. 
Two main conclusions can be derived from these results:
- Absent return differentials, f€U = 0 but f$E, f$C¤0. Irrespective of relative returns,
there is a demand for dollar-denominated assets which results from the liquidity
risk on non-dollar assets. The higher the liquidity risk on euro assets, the higher the
demand for dollar assets. Conversely, exchange-rate volatility tends to reduce this
liquidity-seeking demand.
- The demand for foreign assets rises with their expected return, but liquidity and
exchange-rate risks affect negatively the sensitivity of optimal shares to return
differentials.
Then, enhancing the liquidity of euro and/or renminbi-denominated assets (ie
reducing the liquidity risk of both types of assets) would reduce both the bias
towards dollar holdings and increase the sensitivity of portfolio allocations to
expected return differentials. Raising the ﬂexibility of the renminbi (ie increasing
the volatility of the renminbi-dollar exchange rate) would reduce the bias of the
Chinese investor in favour of the dollar while reducing their responsiveness to return
differentials.
Equity
• Adjustment symmetry: Provided the key currencies are truly allowed to ﬂoat, a
multipolar system would reduce the asymmetry of balance-of-payment
adjustments among the major currencies, hence removing the deﬂationary bias
related to the pressure to adjust exerted only on deﬁcit countries. Asymmetry
would, however, still prevail at regional level. The multilateral scenario would not
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yield similar beneﬁts if some major players were to peg their currencies to the SDR:
surplus countries would accumulate SDRs rather than dollar reserves, with no more
incentive to adjust than in the current system. However, the pooling of oﬃcial
reserves within some form of substitution account would allow liquidity to be
redistributed to those countries in need, hence erasing the deﬂationary bias caused
by asymmetric adjustment (see Stiglitz Commission, 2009). The bias could also be
reduced by a smaller incentive to accumulate reserves, although it can be argued
that the diversiﬁcation of foreign-exchange reserves through the SDR could in fact
increase the willingness to accumulate more reserves. Finally, in all three scenarios,
enhanced surveillance and ﬁnancial safety nets could contribute to more symmetry
in the three scenarios, compared to the current IMS.
• Exorbitant privilege and global seignorage: In both scenarios 2 and 3, the ‘exorbitant
privilege’ of issuing international reserve assets would be shared, as well as
seignorage. 
• Policy spillovers: In all scenarios, the focus of multilateral surveillance on policy
spillovers from ‘systemic’ countries would contribute to reducing the scope for
detrimental spillover effects. In scenario 2, the move to more ﬂexible exchange-
rate regimes would further reduce the spillovers from foreign policy shocks since
the countries concerned would no longer ‘import’ foreign interest rates. It would also
reduce the scope for indirect spillovers, as explained in Box 5.3. The move from
dollar pegs to regional pegs would also alleviate the spillover problem to the extent
that economic cycles are more regional than global. In turn, the use of SDR pegs
would dilute the problem of policy spillovers.
BOX 5.3: Direct and indirect policy spillovers
Bénassy-Quéré, Carton and Gauvin (2011b) use a macroeconomic model with
explicit microeconomic foundations to study the international policy spillovers in
a three-country framework (the United States, China and the euro area). The model
has overlapping generations and nominal rigidities (Calvo pricing). Monetary
policies are modelled using Taylor rules. Fiscal policies consist of setting the level
of pensions, given the exogenous tax rate on labour endowment so that the debt-
to-GDP ratio converges at a certain pace towards its long-run, exogenous target
level. 
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In the model, China differs from the two other areas through two ﬁnancial frictions:
(i) a constraint on ﬁrms’ borrowing, and (ii) a constraint on international capital
inﬂows and outﬂows. Additionally, it is assumed that China can run either a ﬁxed
exchange-rate regime, or a free-ﬂoating regime. In the former case, the Chinese
monetary rule is adjusted to account for the impact of imperfectly sterilised reserve
accumulation. The model is used to successively study two policy shocks in the
United States (a cut in the public debt target, and a monetary tightening) and one
structural shock in China (an increase in the generosity of the pay-as-you-go
pension system). These policy shocks are successively studied under three
different monetary regimes in China:
• a ﬁxed exchange rate against the US dollar with (incomplete) capital controls.
• a ﬁxed exchange rate against the US dollar with a relaxation of capital controls.
• a free-ﬂoating exchange rate with a relaxation of capital controls.
It is found that policy spillovers from the United States to China critically depend on
its monetary regime: a ﬂexible exchange rate insulates the Chinese economy (for
GDP, employment, consumption, although not the trade balance) from US ﬁscal and
monetary shocks, whereas in a ﬁxed peg to the dollar, China ‘imports’ the US
monetary policy and exchange rate against the euro, and all the more as capital
controls are relaxed.
Policy spillovers from the United States to the euro area do not depend on the
Chinese monetary regime for ﬁscal shocks. In the case of monetary shocks, however,
they are magniﬁed by an asymmetric monetary regime in China, since the renminbi
co-moves with the dollar against the euro without this being compensated for by
demand variations in the other direction.
Finally, it is found that pension reform in China has a relatively similar impact on the
US and on the euro-area economies even when the Chinese monetary regime is
asymmetric. The reason for this is the high level of capital mobility between the
United States and the euro area. It is also found that spillovers are magniﬁed by a
relaxation of capital controls in China.
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45. Our analysis partially conﬁrms the conclusions of Mateos y Lago et al (2009) concerning the merits of hegemony
versus multipolarity.
46. See Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2010) for an assessment of the ‘currency war’ that broke out in the autumn of 2010. 
On the whole, scenario 3 appears somewhat superior to scenario 2 for eﬃciency and
stability, and to some extent also for equity,. But it is also much less likely to
materialise. The main good news from our analysis, however, is that, should there be
little appetite for a multilateral solution, there is plenty of scope for improving the
functioning of the IMS through fostering the emergence of a multipolar system45.
It should be emphasised, though, that the gains from multipolarity can only materialise
if key currencies are truly allowed to ﬂoat (although maybe in a dirty way), and if third
countries move towards more ﬂexibility or regional pegs. Although the internationalisa -
tion of the renminbi will make its ﬂexibility more acceptable for both China and its
regional partners, many emerging countries will be likely to continue to value
exchange-rate stability (as part of their ‘fear of ﬂoating’, see Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).
To the extent that each country tries to monitor its competitiveness through foreign-
exchange interventions, this could trigger more frequent ‘currency wars’ that are a
direct consequence of a collective action failure46.
Our multipolar scenario should therefore not be regarded as an easy way out of the
intricacies of recent international monetary debates. Fostering the emergence of a
multipolar monetary world would only help because such a world would probably be
conducive to ﬁnding responses to the very same issues. 
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6 Transition
In the previous section we discussed the pros and cons of three scenarios, as
compared with the present, hybrid system. We concluded that the most ambitious
scenario in terms of cooperation (scenario 3) would probably deliver the largest
improvements, but that its likelihood is currently limited. In the short run, given the
directions taken by the G20, the ‘repair-and-improve’ scenario (scenario 1) seems the
most likely, whereas in the medium term (10-15 years), market forces should favour
scenario 2. Finally, scenario 3 may be revived at some stage, for instance after major
monetary turmoil. In all cases, the transformation of the IMS is likely to take some time. 
In this section we concentrate on the transition from the current state of affairs to new
arrangements. Shedding light on this process is necessary for at least two reasons.
First, the likelihood of the scenarios depends on the diﬃculties of the transition toward
them. Second, history can be path dependent, which means that past and current
developments may affect the eventual outcome. 
To some extent transition is already underway. On the policy front, the IMF has
introduced new liquidity facilities and plans further additions to its toolbox. The
suggestion was made, though not upheld in subsequent discussions, to institu -
tionalise the central bank swap agreements reached during the crisis. Signiﬁcant steps
have been made to reform surveillance at global level, by the IMF and through mutual
assessment among G20 countries. The governance of the IMF is being reformed. There
is a new debate on capital controls and more generally the management of capital
ﬂows. Financial regulatory reform is likely to have repercussions on the functioning
of the IMS. At regional levels, surveillance and liquidity provision are undergoing major
reforms in the euro area. China, also, is gradually implementing various reforms to
internationalise the renminbi. And there are many more initiatives both at global and
regional levels. 
Concerning market-driven changes, as discussed in section 3, the IMS has already
moved away from a pure dollar-based system and this process is bound to continue.
The global crisis and its aftershocks are reshaping the world economy and the roles of
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47. The ‘qualiﬁed foreign institutional investor’ scheme was introduced in 2002 and allowed selected international
investors access to Chinese A shares denominated in RMB on the stock exchange, up to a ﬁxed quota.
48. See Vallée (2011) for details. 
the major currencies. The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area and concerns about US
ﬁscal sustainability are leading investors worldwide to reassess their priorities. The
same applies to renewed concerns over the persistence of global imbalances. More
fundamentally, the changing balance of global economic power is destined to trigger
changes in the roles of international currencies. 
In this section, we focus mainly on the transition towards a multipolar system
(scenario 2), because we want to explore its feasibility and likelihood. However, our
third scenario, renewed multilateralism, though somewhat remote, cannot be
excluded. Hence we will, when needed, mention the corresponding costs and beneﬁts
and the conditions required to attain it.
We ﬁrst discuss the prospects for renminbi internationalisation (section 6.1). Then,
acknowledging that the transition to a multipolar system will take at least a decade, we
discuss the potential for rebalancing (section 6.2) and exchange-rate instability
(section 6.3) within the present IMS. Issues speciﬁc to the euro area are discussed in
section 7. 
6.1 The path of renminbi internationalisation 
The potential for internationalisation of the renminbi is a central issue for the evolution
of the IMS: without this, our multipolar scenario is not feasible, and even some of the
beneﬁts of the repair-and-improve scenario require some (limited) opening up of
China’s ﬁnancial account.
Since 2009 China has started experimenting, with characteristic caution, a limited
internationalisation of the renminbi. Initiatives in this direction include renminbi cross-
border trade settlement, the issuance of renminbi-denominated bonds in Hong Kong,
the establishment of an offshore RMB market, the settlement of overseas direct
investments in renminbi, and an expansion of the so called ‘qualiﬁed foreign
institutional investor scheme’47. China has also taken steps to increase its role as a
provider of last-resort liquidity by participating in the Chiang Mai multilateralisation
process. In addition, the People’s Bank of China entered renminbi-based bilateral swap
agreements with six countries in 2008-09, which were joined by two additional
countries in 2010 and two more in 2011. This is, at least, a plain declaration of intent48.
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Yet broad-based capital controls, both for inﬂows and outﬂows, are maintained. In spite
of unambiguous international pressure the Chinese authorities are still reluctant to
open their ﬁnancial account more decisively, make their currency more ﬂexible and
liberalise their domestic ﬁnancial system.
Are Beijing’s initiatives too cautious to have impact? Or will Chinese gradualism once
again prove effective? There is widespread consensus among academics and policy
players that the renminbi will only gain a meaningful international role if China
concedes on the ﬂexibility of the exchange rate, the convertibility of capital and
ﬁnancial account and the opening of the domestic ﬁnancial sector to enhanced foreign
participation. Vallée (2011), however, argues that the renminbi could achieve
signiﬁcant internationalisation and play an important anchor role regionally, within
the next 5-10 years, in spite of China keeping a relatively closed ﬁnancial system and
a moderate degree of currency ﬂexibility and convertibility. 
We consider that China’s gradualist strategy can lead to achieving limited international
status for the renminbi. To this end, China would have to progress on three fronts: 
• Develop offshore financial markets: China will need to take steps to deepen and
broaden its capital markets to start establishing the renminbi as a unit of account
and store of value. The creation of the renminbi offshore market addresses this
challenge, but the future of the renminbi as an international currency is very much
tied to the liquidity, depth and diversity of its market, which by all measures remains
in its infancy. As long as the distinction between onshore and offshore currency
exists, it is likely that some actors (foreign central banks in particular) will prefer
accessing the domestic onshore ﬁnancial system. It is essential for China to
manage this tension if it wants to internationalise its currency while maintaining a
large degree of control over its ﬁnancial account.
• Enhance China’s regional monetary role: for the renminbi to gain an even limited
international role, it needs to be established as a regional anchor with the
responsibilities that this entails (such as lender of last resort and beacon of
economic stability). The multilateralisation of the Chiang Mai Initiative and the
central role that China intends to play in it can be seen as an important, but most
likely insuﬃcient, step in this direction. The activation of the bilateral swap
arrangement, which has so far only been used by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
in the context of the trade settlement scheme, will be a testing experience. Given
regional political tensions and the testing experience of the euro area, it is unlikely
that hopes of currency union will materialise in the coming years, but the renminbi
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49. Financial openness will be especially needed if China continues to run a current-account surplus, hence it will be
unable to disseminate renminbi-denominated assets without two-way capital mobility.
could nonetheless gradually become the de-facto anchor of the Asia currency bloc.
• Reform the domestic financial system: China will have to engage in a deep and wide
reform of its internal ﬁnancial system, including a thorough regulatory overhaul,
ending its ﬁnancial repression and ﬁscal dominance, enhancing private-sector
involvement in the distribution and allocation of credit, and modernisating and
developing market infrastructures. The plan to establish Shanghai as a leading
ﬁnancial centre by 2020, potentially building on the lessons learned from Hong
Kong and Singapore’s experiences, could function as a catalyst for ﬁnancial market
deepening in China. 
While these steps will naturally complement initiatives launched so far and help
achieve a limited international role for the currency, more signiﬁcant reforms will be
necessary if the renminbi is to become a truly global currency. At present, it is unclear
if China intends to take this further step in the foreseeable future. However, the
currency internationalisation process is to some extent self reinforcing: after the ﬁrst
steps are taken, China’s policymakers will face diﬃculty remaining in mid-course;
forces will be set in motion that will encourage further steps forward. These would need
to include: 
• Currency convertibility, full financial openness, and exchange-rate flexibility: major
reforms of the Chinese exchange-rate system and ﬁnancial account openness are
indispensible if the renminbi is to compete for a premier international currency
role49. The distinction between offshore and onshore transactions which allow
Chinese authorities to maintain a high degree of controls will have to diminish over
time and eventually be eliminated. In addition, a dominant international currency
cannot be pegged unilaterally.
• Issuance of high-quality assets: the issuer of a major reserve currency needs to
issue a large amount of high-quality assets (a precondition for serving as a store of
value), which China cannot supply while it remains a net creditor and maintains
controls on ﬁnancial outﬂows. In this context, China will have to reduce capital
controls to allow for bi-directional capital ﬂows and/or to convincingly complete its
ongoing internal rebalancing in order to decrease its savings ratio.
• Rule of law: Beijing will need to establish an internationally trusted rule of law and
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a legal system that ensures predictability and enforceability of all legal claims. An
option, chosen by some countries, is to keep their ﬁnancial/business laws separate
from their standard legal system so that the liberal principle of a free and fair trial
does not become a feature of domestic national law. However, such a half-way
solution for China would also carry political stability risks.
• International engagement: China will have to embrace the idea of a bigger role in
global ﬁnancial and monetary affairs and to accept commensurate responsibilities.
This commitment will need to translate into a policy of international engagement
with the intention of increasing the international role of the renminbi. This will imply
a new form of international ﬁnancial diplomacy and a more active leadership role in
the international ﬁnancial institutions, for example in the deﬁnition and
implementation of appropriate adjustments through the G20 framework for growth.
Such decisions by China, if and when they materialise, are unlikely to be driven by
domestic considerations alone. This is where the cooperative element enters the
picture, and can play an important role in shaping future IMS reform. If any progress is
to be made, in the time horizon we consider, towards a stronger role for the SDR, it is
inconceivable that this can happen without the active participation of China. As we
have already noted, scenario 3 has a negligible probability of materialising at present,
but its likelihood would increase in an environment of monetary turmoil characterised,
for example, by disorderly dollar depreciation and renewed unstable ﬁnancial-market
conditions. These are precisely the conditions in which monetary cooperation would
become more likely, and in which the potential rewards for the Chinese authorities to
enter the cooperation game would increase.
We consider it highly conceivable that, if all these policy choices are made, the
renminbi will acquire a key international currency status and become a serious
challenger to the euro in the next decade, eventually possibly succeeding in overtaking
both the euro and the dollar as the hegemon by 2050 if not before. However, each and
every one of those steps implies challenges and trade-offs, and hard decisions that the
Chinese authorities may not be able, or not willing, to make at the right moment. If that
were the case, the potential for the renminbi would be more limited. China’s currency
could nonetheless establish itself as a leading second-tier international currency (like
the yen or sterling today) with a signiﬁcant and growing regional importance.
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BOX 6.1: The RMB in the SDR: When and what consequences?
In April 2011 in Washington, the G20 ﬁnance ministers and central bankers agreed
to work on a ‘criteria-based path to broaden the composition of the SDR’ (ﬁnal
communiqué). This process is linked to a broader discussion about the role of
emerging economies in the IMS and the need to take into account the growing role
that they play in the world economy. 
This decision raises two issues: (i) is the inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR a true
possibility in the short or medium run? and (ii) what difference would it make for
the IMS?
The selection of the currencies included in the SDR is not carved in stone and has
changed a number of times in the last 50 years. It can be changed by the IMF’s
Executive Board with by a majority of 85 percent (the valuation method, including
the weight of the different currencies being itself reviewed every ﬁve years by 70-
percent majority). 
In October 2000, the Board of the IMF decided that four currencies would be included
in the SDR: those of the four largest exporters (exports being measured over the ﬁve
years preceding the effective date of the revision of the basket) with ‘freely usable’
currencies. The deﬁnition of ‘freely usable’ relies on Article XXX of the IMF’s Articles
of Agreement:
“A freely usable currency means a member’s currency that the Fund judges, in fact,
(i) widely used to make payments for international transactions, and (ii) is widely
traded in the principal exchange markets.” (IMF Articles of Agreement, XXX (f)).
The precise interpretation of this article is left to the IMF’s Executive Board and has
varied over time. The concept of ‘free usability’ differs from that of full convertibility
(Vallée, 2011). In the past, some currencies were often included in the SDR basket
with some remaining constraints on their convertibility. However, it is important for
the proper functioning and usefulness of the SDR that the currencies included in the
basket are widely traded internationally and can provide a meaningful interest-rate
benchmark, in order for the SDR return to be meaningful.
In the absence of consistent data on trade invoicing, the ﬁrst criterion (widespread
use for international transactions) has so far been assessed on the basis of the
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share of the country in global exports of goods and services. Although those
transactions are still primarily settled in US dollars, China qualiﬁes as the ﬁrst
exporter in the world and is undoubtedly making progress towards increased use
of the renminbi as an invoicing and payment currency. 
The second criterion (trades in exchange markets) is assessed through the share of the
currency in oﬃcial reserves as well as in foreign-exchange market turnover and denomi -
nation of international bonds and bank loans. In this respect, the Chinese currency is still
far from being ‘freely usable’. In its last review in 2010, the Executive Board considered
the ‘freely usable’ criterion was not met yet for the renminbi precisely on these grounds
but decided to keep the matter under close review, thereby potentially paving the way
for the renminbi to be included during the next review in 2015.
If we posit that the inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR is a possibility, the next
question is what effect it would have on the IMS. In order to make this assessment,
it may be useful to rely on the same taxonomy used in section 5: eﬃciency, stability
and equity.
Efficiency: the original purpose of the SDR in 1969 was to supplement the US dollar
as a source of international liquidity. Including the renminbi in the SDR would be
consistent with the role the People’s Bank of China has started to play as a liquidity
provider through the development of bilateral swap lines with foreign central banks.
More importantly, the inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR and the associated
reduced volatility of the SDR against the renminbi would work as an incentive for the
People’s Bank of China to provide dollars in exchange for SDR on a voluntary basis,
which would reduce its dollar exposure (although the potential for diversiﬁcation
through SDR holdings will remain limited unless there are more active allocations in
the future). Hence, including the renminbi in the SDR could contribute to enhancing
the international ﬁnancial safety net.
Stability: offering China a way to diversify its reserves with little market impact and
without the use of a controversial substitution account would be an achievement in
terms of stability. However, to the extent that the renminbi stays more or less pegged
to the USD, having the renminbi in the SDR would, all else being equal, raise the
volatility of the basket for currencies that are not de jure or de facto pegged to the
dollar. This could reduce the incentive for the corresponding countries to use the
SDR. Rather, it could increase the incentive to peg currencies to the dollar around
the world and accumulate dollars as a liquid proxy of the SDR. 
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6.2 Global rebalancing
We have noted that a serious ﬂaw of the current international monetary regime is that
it lacks a powerful mechanism for adjusting external imbalances. Discipline is enforced
only on non-dominant external-deﬁcit countries, but does not provide incentives to
countries in external surplus to adjust, nor does it include incentives for the United
States. 
To substitute price-led adjustments, the G20 partners are trying to enhance sur -
veillance through the Mutual Assessment Process, and the IMF is following a parallel
path through the preparation of ‘spillover reports’ for ‘systemic’ countries. 
In this section, we assess what rebalancing can deliver. This is intended to shed light
on what can be expected from the ‘repair-and-improve’ scenario. However, broader
lessons can be drawn about the possibility of adjustment under alternative exchange-
rate and capital-mobility assumptions.
Equity: including the renminbi in the SDR can be viewed as a way to have China take
more responsibility in the functioning of the global monetary system. However, it
would also be a way to allow international investors to take long positions in the
Chinese currency even before it is made convertible. This could encourage rather
than discourage reserve accumulation (in the form of SDRs). More importantly, it
would amount to socialising the exchange-rate risk. Assume, for instance, that when
allowed to ﬂoat, the renminbi appreciates against the other currencies of the SDR
basket. Then, any country holding SDRs will be able to convert them into key
currencies at an inﬂated exchange rate, the loss being borne by the central bank
that makes the swap.
Overall, the main motivation for considering the inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR
basket through a ‘criteria-based path’ may be to encourage China to embrace the
multilateral liquidity-provision framework as opposed to bilateral arrangements seen
so far. It is also important to encourage China to gradually improve the ﬂexibility of
its exchange rate and eventually relax restrictions on ﬁnancial transactions which
will help establish the renminbi in ﬁnancial markets and in international reserves.
Finally, having the ﬁve major international currencies in the SDR could be conducive
to creating a G5 monetary group for consultation on exchange-rate and monetary
issues. 
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50. After setting the goal of ‘universal social security coverage for urban and rural residents by 2020’ in 2006, the
Chinese authorities took decisive action especially concerning health insurance (see Li, 2011) and the pension
system (Herd, Hu and Koen, 2010). In particular, it was decided in 2005 to reduce the share of the ‘individual
account’ in the calculation of pension beneﬁts, thereby raising the replacement rate for urban households, and in
2009 a new rural pension programme was launched with the aim of progressively extending the coverage from 10
percent of the counties at end-2009 to 50 percent in 2012 and complete coverage by 2020. The twelfth 5-year plan
approved in 2011 has conﬁrmed the extension of social-security coverage as a top policy priority.
51. The results also show that, should the US Federal Reserve refrain from reacting to the reduction in global savings,
the rebalancing would be muted and the exchange-rate regime of China would gain in importance. This point is
important to understand the sensitivity of the exchange-rate issue in the US before monetary policy has been
normalised.
We rely on model-based simulations as in Box 5.3, except that now the model is
reduced to only two countries: a deﬁcit country (the US), and a surplus one (China),
with a ﬁxed nominal exchange rate and capital controls between the two (see Bénassy-
Quéré, Carton and Gauvin, 2011a). We successively examine rebalancing policies in
China and in the US and compare their implications under the ﬁxed exchange-rate
regime and the alternative regimes deﬁned in Box 5.3.
Rebalancing in China
The Chinese response to international calls for rebalancing has been to start
addressing one major cause of high household savings, namely the weakness of the
social safety net50. The structural reforms considered are an increase in the generosity
of China’s pension system, a ﬁnancial reform that facilitates the access of private
companies to debt markets while removing capital subsidies, and an increase in the
government debt target. 
The results indicate that a fall in China’s saving rate would contribute to global
rebalancing whatever the exchange-rate regime, provided international capital ﬂows
react to interest-rate differentials (which implies less-than-complete capital controls
in China). Under a ﬂexible exchange-rate regime, the reduction of the bilateral current-
account imbalance between the United States and China is eventually not stronger
than under a ﬁxed exchange-rate regime. However, it is quicker (because the renminbi
appreciates in nominal terms against the US dollar, instead of appreciating in real terms
through domestic inﬂation). Moreover, only under a ﬂexible exchange-rate regime
would China be able to control inﬂation stemming from more dynamic domestic
demand. These ﬁndings indicate that the country that would beneﬁt most from China
moving away from its ﬁxed peg when it implements demand-enhancing reforms is
China itself. For the United States the advantage of such a move will only be transitory51.
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One interpretation of global imbalances is that of ‘forced savings’: by accumulating
foreign exchange reserves while controlling capital outﬂows, the Chinese authorities
manage to control the aggregate net savings rate of the nation. This interpretation is
consistent with fast reserve accumulation that can hardly be explained by excess
savings in the private sector (Cova, 2009). The model conﬁrms the importance of
reserve accumulation as a key driver of current-account surpluses. Importantly, it is
found that simply reducing the objective of reserve holdings is capable of cutting the
current-account surplus, even when the exchange rate is not allowed to ﬂoat. The
reason is that reducing reserve accumulation forces the central bank to reduce its
interest rate if it wants the nominal exchange rate to stay constant. Such a cut in the
interest rate boosts domestic demand, hence reducing the current-account surplus.
On the whole, the various simulations suggest that the combination of (i) demand-
enhancing reforms in China and (ii) reduced willingness to accumulate oﬃcial reserves
could be a powerful driver of global rebalancing, should the Chinese authorities be
active in the implementation – this result holds whatever the exchange-rate regime,
provided capital controls are not complete. This is relatively good news for the ‘repair-
and-improve’ scenario which includes domestic structural and macroeconomic
policies (through the MAP) and a reduction in the incentives to accumulate reserves.
Furthermore, these results suggest that the type and pace of renminbi inter nationalisa -
tion envisaged in the previous section is not necessarily contradictory with China’s
contributing to global rebalancing, provided further structural reforms take place.
Rebalancing from the US
Since the US has the largest current-account deﬁcit, an important question for global
rebalancing is what to expect from an increase in public savings in the US and monetary
tightening. The same model is used to answer this question (see Bénassy-Quéré, Carton
and Gauvin, 2011b). Speciﬁcally, the analysis of US public savings assesses the impact
of the reduction of the US debt target through a transitory cut in pensions. The main
counterpart of this debt contraction is the fall in US households’ holdings of public bonds.
However, foreign households also reduce their holdings of US bonds. On the whole, the
US net foreign-asset position rises. Not surprisingly, the rebalancing effect of the shock
is larger when Chinese capital controls are relaxed than with the status quo. 
A temporary monetary contraction in the US does not have a permanent impact. In the
ﬁxed exchange-rate regime, China imports the monetary stance of the US, especially
when capital controls are relaxed. In this case, relaxing capital controls without allowing
the RMB to ﬂoat leads the rebalancing to be muted. 
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We conclude that the ‘repair-and-improve’ scenario, which monitors signiﬁcant domes -
tic policy shifts while reducing the incentive to accumulate oﬃcial reserves, can be
powerful in rebalancing the global economy even without a major shift in exchange-
rate and capital regimes. However, it should be borne in mind that monetary policy is
unable to produce any rebalancing between countries linked by a ﬁxed exchange rate.
In terms of the transition, our analysis reinforces the case for scenario 1 as a temporary
arrangement before scenario 2 emerges.
6.3 Exchange-rate instability
The transition from the current, largely unipolar, system toward a multipolar one raises
the important issue of the potential for exchange-rate volatility and exchange-rate
misalignment. Using a three-country portfolio-choice model with the US, the euro area
and China as the three participants, Bénassy-Quéré and Pisani-Ferry (2011) show that
a rise in Chinese wealth, a diversiﬁcation of China’s portfolio, or more generally shocks
affecting China are not neutral for the euro/dollar exchange rate as long as China keeps
a ﬁxed exchange rate against the dollar, whereas they are neutral both in a ﬂexible
regime and if the renminbi is pegged to a symmetrical basket. They also show that a
large Chinese bias in favour of dollar-denominated assets can reverse the impact of
wealth transfers on the euro/dollar exchange rate, but these destabilising impacts can
be moderated by an internationalisation of the renminbi. Hence, before the Chinese
currency is internationalised, and unless China’s peg moves from a bilateral to a
multilateral one (possibly on the SDR), the euro-dollar exchange rate (as well as other
bilateral rates) will suffer volatility coming from this third country. 
Additionally, the transition to a multipolar monetary system involves a diversiﬁcation
of oﬃcial reserves, with a possibly disruptive impact on the euro and other alternatives
to the dollar (yen, sterling, Swiss franc, but also miscellaneous currencies whose share
has risen in recent years, see section 3). Fortunately, there is a strong incentive for
central banks, especially those holding large amounts of reserves, not to act in a
destabilising way on the foreign-exchange market. But one cannot exclude reserve
diversiﬁcation triggering large, although temporary, misalignments. In this respect,
tighter coordination of exchange rates could be useful during the transition: scenario
3 can itself be viewed as a stepping-stone towards scenario 2, with more generous
SDR allocations helping central banks to diversify their reserves without too much
impact on exchange rates, before the renminbi can step in as a new reserve asset.
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7 Implications for the euro area
We have emphasised in the preceding sections that future monetary developments will
depend on economic fundamentals and on market forces, but also on the main players’
policies and strategic choices. In particular, we have emphasised that in comparison
to the US and China, governance weaknesses and the absence of oﬃcial support for
an increased role of the euro as an international currency (see Table 4 in section 4)
have been characteristic of the euro area.
This characterisation does not automatically translate into policy prescriptions, however.
Currencies are not primarily instruments of diplomacy. Nor is the prestige of an
international currency a goal to be pursued unconditionally. The so-called exorbitant
privilege of issuing an international currency is less signiﬁcant than often thought,
especially taking into account that it comes with ‘exorbitant duties’ (Gourinchas, Rey and
Govillot, 2010). Rather, policy prescriptions have to be grounded in a comparative
assessment of the economic costs and beneﬁts of the three scenarios from the point of
view of the euro area, using the same criteria as used for the comparative assess ment of
chapter 5: eﬃciency, stability and equity. Only on this basis can policy options be outlined.
7.1 Scenario assessment from the euro-area’s viewpoint
Why should the assessment of the three scenarios differ for the global economy and
for individual countries? There are three main reasons for this: (i) ‘exorbitant’ privileges
and duties, (ii) asymmetric starting points, and (iii) different relative weighting of the
eﬃciency, stability and equity criteria.
Privileges and duties 
As underlined by Gourinchas, Rey and Govillot (2010), to be the issuer of an
international currency involves both beneﬁts and costs. Beneﬁts mainly relate to
seignorage and reduced risks for residents in their trades with the rest of the world.
They have been widely discussed in the literature (see, eg Papaioannou and Portes,
2008). Costs are less straightforward. Beyond the traditional fear of a loss of control
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over monetary aggregates (which may not be well founded given the relative stability
of foreign holdings in normal times), the main duty of the international reserve-issuer
is the responsibility to provide the global economy with international liquidity in times
of crisis, as was experienced during the 2007-08 liquidity crisis when the Fed did not
hesitate to extend generous swap lines to a number of foreign central banks. 
Gourinchas et al further argue that the ‘exorbitant privilege’ of the United States
materialises in excess return on assets relative to liabilities due to the ‘world banker’
structure of the US balance sheet, with risky assets and riskless liabilities. This structure
is admittedly only partially attributable to the international role of the US dollar, but it is
strongly correlated with it because the issuer of the international currency has to rely
on a deep and sophisticated ﬁnancial system that is able to offer safe assets to the rest
of the world. The counterpart of this ‘exorbitant privilege’ is an ‘exorbitant duty’ that
materialised during the crisis through a collapse of the US net foreign-asset position as
a consequence of the collapse of stock prices and of the appreciation of the dollar
resulting from the safe-haven effect. Gourinchas et al hypo the sise that only a country
with relatively low risk aversion and a high recovery rate on domestic bonds can play
this role of a global banker and accrue the associated privileges and duties. This raises
the question of whether the euro area would be ready for the job.
Asymmetric starting points 
Another reason why the euro-area viewpoint could differ from that of China or the
United States is that the starting point is highly asymmetric, as indicated in Table 6
(page 70) by the low grade given to the ‘repair-and-improve’ scenario concerning
equity. The euro area may have a special interest in a reform of the IMS since it suffers
from the ﬁxity of the dollar-renminbi exchange rate. However, moving from a unipolar
to a multipolar IMS would imply that the demand for euro-denominated assets would
to a great extent be determined by non-residents and could be subject to abrupt
changes; it would probably also imply more exchange-rate volatility, as portfolio
diversiﬁcation away from or into the euro would give rise to exchange-rate movements.
Different weightings 
Europe has a tradition of emphasising stability. This has been especially apparent in
its monetary choices since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system: from the
European snake to monetary union, the Europeans have expressed dislike of
exchange-rate volatility. This is also the case in China, but much less in other countries
especially the United States, whose motto has been benign neglect. The risk of
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increasing exchange-rate volatility across monetary blocs may reduce the incentive
for the euro area to act in favour of scenario 2, although this scenario would also reduce
the scope for big currency crises. By the same token, Europe has developed mainly
through building a network of rules and surveillance, a predictable world very much in
line with scenario 3. 
On the whole, given its revealed preferences, scenario 3 would probably be the
preferred option for the euro area. However, as already mentioned, this is the least
likely scenario given the present appetite for international cooperation. If the choice is
between the two other scenarios, scenario 2 would in principle be preferable to
scenario 1 because it would yield less scope for exchange-rate misalignments, more
discipline and more resilience to shocks. But the likely increase in exchange-rate
volatility, combined with the ‘exorbitant duty’ related to the international currency
status, may reduce the attractiveness of this scenario.
The attractiveness of scenario 2 is also reduced by its short-term implications: as long
as access to renminbi-denominated assets remains limited, reserve diversiﬁcation
away from the US dollar risks being overwhelmingly into the euro. 
The real choice, however, may not end up being between scenario 1 (repair and improve)
and scenario 2 (tripolarity), rather between scenario 2 and what we have called scenario
2a, bipolarity with the dollar and the renminbi as the two poles, with the euro remaining
a regional currency for eastern Europe, a region that has already achieved a high level
of trade, ﬁnancial and labour market integration with the euro area, which is not expected
to be reversed even in the absence of enhanced internationalisation of the euro.
Scenario 2a could in fact present several attractive economic features for the euro area
in that it would reduce the asymmetry of the IMS and increase its eﬃciency without
burdening the euro area with ‘exorbitant duties’. But it would mark the end of Europe’s
ambition to export its policy principles and preferences. 
As indicated in chapter 5, the evolution towards multipolarity is likely to be largely
market-driven, but market forces alone are not enough for a currency to grow
internationally, as shown by the examples of the dollar at the beginning of the
twentieth century, or the yen in the 1980s. The development of world-class capital
markets and ﬁnancial stability are key. Both require determined policy action. For the
euro to acquire a similar status to the dollar, signiﬁcant policy decisions would need to
be taken in the euro area, with the additional complexity of its multi-country structure.
Refraining, or failing, to do so could cause the IMS to end up as a bipolar, dollar-renminbi
conﬁguration, in other words scenario 2a.
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To the extent that exchange-rate misalignments and adjustment asymmetries are
sourced out of the euro area, scenario 2a would be almost as good as scenario 2 as far
as stability is concerned, while not being very different for eﬃciency. However, there
would be a trade-off between beneﬁtting from a share of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ (and
taking responsibility for part of the ‘exorbitant duties’) and remaining a secondary
player. This is, in essence, a political choice. 
7.2 Policy implications
What gave international currency status to the US dollar was not primarily a deliberate
policy by the United States government to internationalise its currency. At the
beginning of the twentieth century it was to stabilise the economy and boost ﬁnancial
activity, not to rival sterling, that the Federal Reserve System was created and ﬁnancial
activity deregulated. Similarly, the steps taken today by China primarily aim at creating
a bond market, reducing reliance on foreign markets and institutions and preparing
for a new monetary regime. The internationalisation of the renminbi may help attain
these internal objectives, but renminbi internationalisation is neither necessary nor
suﬃcient. Similarly, the overriding priority for the euro area is to put its house in order
through a comprehensive strategy:
• The euro area should ﬁrst and foremost improve its growth outlook, correct internal
real exchange-rate misalignments and restore the sustainability of public ﬁnances;
these are essential conditions for the area’s integrity and prosperity.
• Second, it should continue improving its internal governance so that policy failures
of the kind experienced in the 2000s are avoided.
• Third, the architecture of ﬁnancial integration within the euro area should be
strengthened, and the reform of ﬁnancial regulation should be completed, in order
to make sure that the beneﬁts of market integration do not come at a price in terms
of ﬁnancial stability.
This is a straightforward agenda and movement on these three fronts would be
instrumental to succeeding in a scenario of gradual and limited international reform
(scenario 1) as well as in a more ambitious scenario where the euro area is expected
to become one of the major pillars of the world monetary order (scenarios 2 and 3). 
However, a major difference between the euro area and its two partners is the lack of
political union. For reasons indicated in section 4, monetary leadership may imply an
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52. The absence of monetary backing is, however, a guarantee against the monetisation risk. Overall, the real value of
US government securities may well be less secure than that of high-quality euro-area securities, but their nominal
value is more secure, which also matters for investors. 
ability to take decisions and commit resources, which does not belong to the remit of
the managers of a currency without state backing. Hence, additional reforms would be
necessary to enable the euro to become a fully ﬂedged international currency. In order
to play such role, the euro area would have to do the following:
• Streamline external representation, with a view to consolidating it in the main
international monetary institutions. A single chair in the IMF board is not on the
short-term agenda but it remains a possibility for which the euro area has to prepare
and take preliminary steps. 
• Address its inability to supply reserve assets. As indicated in Table 4 (page 46), the
frag mentation of the euro-area sovereign bond market is a major obstacle to a wider
international role for the euro. In comparison to US Treasury bonds, euro-area
government securities suffer from two signiﬁcant handicaps. First, sovereign-debt
markets are signiﬁcantly less deep and liquid because of the fragmentation effect;
and, second, they involve greater default risk because of the absence of monetary
backing52. Being less liquid and less safe at the same time is a major shortcoming.
If the euro is to develop as an international currency, the euro-area authorities
should seriously consider options for creating a new class of euro-wide safe assets
along the lines proposed by Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010).
• Recognise and accept the implications of being the issuer of an international
currency. The ‘neither-encourage-nor-discourage’ stance has, in the ﬁrst decade of
EM Economic and Monetory Union, helped the euro gain some success as an
international currency, without burdening the European Central Bank with external
responsibilities at a time when it had to build its reputation. But the crisis has
already, in many respects, overtaken that position. Partner central banks and
market participants have been given access to exceptional euro liquidity in
situations of liquidity dry-up. So far these operations have remained exceptional,
reserved for use in crisis management mode, not becoming part of the standard
operational toolkit. If the use of the euro starts to extend, signiﬁcantly and
systematically, beyond the geographical boundary of the euro area, the central
bank operational reach will need to expand more as a matter of routine. 
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8 Conclusions
The debate on the international monetary system is dominated by a series of
immediate issues, such as the reform of the IMF and its facilities, the enhancement of
international surveillance, the strengthening of international ﬁnancial safety nets, the
deﬁnition of a regime for managing capital ﬂows, and the exchange-rate policies of
some key emerging countries. These are all important and urgent problems. But adding
up the responses to each and every of them does not necessarily provide a response
to a more fundamental issue: how should monetary relations evolve in a fast-
transforming world economy? 
This report includes an assessment of the shortcomings of the current regime, and
possible improvements. But instead of limiting ourselves to discussing which reforms
are feasible in the short run we have taken a longer-term perspective, starting from an
analysis of the lessons from economic and monetary history and an evaluation of
future trends in the distribution of international economic power. Based on this
approach we map out a number of possible scenarios for the horizon 2020-25, the
assessment of which is then used to derive insights and priorities that the relevant
authorities could take into accound in policy making in the shorter term
Lessons from history
The history of the IMS tells us that, consistent with the evolution of modern societies
and international relations, there has been since the beginning of the twentieth century
a clear shift of emphasis from external to internal stability. This shift is visible among
the countries that participated in the gold standard and it is only strengthened by the
emergence of new players that were not directly part of the monetary order of the
nineteenth century. The Bretton Woods system represented a brave attempt to strike
a balance between the two goals of external and internal stability. But this balance
was relatively short lived, and once a serious conﬂict between internal and external
priorities emerged, the US government opted for the former and the system collapsed.
The recent behaviour of key international players suggests that the emphasis on
internal stability will be likely to remain pivotal in the decades to come. 
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Another important conclusion from history is that a multipolar system may be able to
persist for several decades. Contrary to the view that there can be only one inter -
national currency at any point in time, economic historians have shown that sterling
and the dollar coexisted as reserve currencies until well after the US economy overtook
the British economy, and even after the establishment of the dollar-based Bretton
Woods system. Even though a global rival of the dollar has not yet emerged, the
prospect of a multipolar world may be less remote than generally thought.
Recent developments
The current system, or ‘non-system’ as some sneeringly call it, emerged painfully from
the ashes of the Bretton Woods regime. But this emergence was accompanied by major
policy reforms at national level such as widespread ﬁnancial liberalisation, the
generalisation of central bank independence, the deﬁnition of policy regimes aimed at
delivering domestic stability and the gradual acceptance of exchange-rate ﬂuctuations.
For some observers and policy players it was deemed to be not just the only viable
system, but also the most desirable one. A system of generalised ﬂoating and ﬂexible
inﬂation-targeting with full capital mobility, at least in the advanced world, seemed
well suited to achieving policymakers’ goals of full employment, stable prices and
sustainable current-account positions. In this setting, their main task was to ‘keep their
own house in order’. International coherence was expected to result from the con -
sistency of national self-centred policy rules. 
Gradually, however, this hope dissipated. To start with, not all major players were
equally committed to exchange-rate ﬂexibility and ﬁnancial-market openness. Indeed,
as pointed out in this report, the share of exchange-rate ﬁxers in global trade has
increased in recent times, not decreased. Second, the volatility of capital ﬂows to and
from emerging markets and the resulting currency crises of the 1900s led to changes
in the policy preferences of several key emerging countries. In the late 1990s, an
unprecedented process of reserve accumulation started, which had far-reaching
consequences for the functioning of the international monetary system. Third, the
desirable properties of the system rested on the assumption that the key players’
macroeconomic policies would remain disciplined and consistent with maintaining
the system in balance, and this proved to be a questionable hypothesis. Partially as a
consequence of these factors, global imbalances widened substantially, and while
there were structural factors rather than monetary factors behind these imbalances,
the IMS made it possible for them to persist. To put it simply, there was no in-built
mechanism to contain the build-up of external imbalances and to ensure policy
correction at national level. Finally, emerging countries have recently been walking
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away from the ‘corner solutions’ of the impossible trinity (ie combinations of two items
among ﬁxed exchange rates, free capital mobility and independent monetary policies).
They have developed mixed strategies involving fear of ﬂoating, targeted capital
controls and ’dirty’ inﬂation targeting, with increasing scope for international conﬂict.
Mapping the future
Both policy- and market-driven changes in the IMS can be expected to take place in the
years next few. 
Policy-driven changes will be the most visible. The IMF, the G20 presidencies of Korea
and France, and a number of G20 members are keen on reforming the current system.
However, different players tend to favour different reforms, and what these signiﬁcant
policy initiatives will in the end deliver remains uncertain. More signiﬁcant will be
national, domestically motivated policy changes such as the signiﬁcant steps taken
by China to progressively internationalise its currency through the develop ment of an
offshore market and simultaneous stimulation of re-denomination of Chinese trade.
At the same time, powerful market forces will inevitably shape the evolution of the
international monetary regime. Ultimately, the changing balance of global economic
power is bound to affect the roles of international currencies. Concerns about ﬁscal
sustainability in the US and, in parallel with the decline of the relative size of the US
economy, the inexorably diminishing ability of the US Treasury to back up dollar
liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve to the rest of the world will most probably
gradually drive demand away from US dollar assets, even in the absence of major
policy reforms. While neither the euro nor the renminbi is ready to rival the dollar, nor
will they be for many years, these forces cannot be ignored.
A major thrust of our report is to deﬁne and assess scenarios for the future evolution
of the international monetary system. Within a 10-15-year horizon we envision three
scenarios whose respective emphases are on:
• Repairing and improving the existing system through incremental reforms.
• Moving towards a multipolar system structured around either three (tripolarity) or
two (bipolarity) international currencies.
• Establishing a strengthened international monetary order based on multilateral
rules and mechanisms.
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The ﬁrst scenario is the least demanding in terms of both domestic policies and
international coordination. Hence it is the most likely in the short run. The third being
the most demanding in terms of both domestic policies and international coordination,
and is then the least likely – barring, at least, a major upheaval that would lead to a
reconsideration of priorities. The second scenario relies on market forces and domestic
policies rather than international cooperation. Its probability is low in the short run,
but signiﬁcant at the 10-15 year horizon. 
We have assessed the three scenarios on the basis of their eﬃciency, stability and
equity. All would offer improvements when compared to the current system. Comparing
the three scenarios to each other, we conclude that the feasibility of the scenarios
seems negatively correlated to their desirability, at least in the short run. We assess
the multipolar and the multilateral scenarios as both superior to the more modest
‘repair-and-improve’ scenario, although their pros and cons vary across the different
criteria. But they are also less likely. 
On the whole, we take the multipolar scenario as the most interesting to explore, and
the one that would best correspond to structural changes in the world economy –
hence the title of this report. We think that policy should take this perspective into
account through taking steps in this direction – for example, the envisaged inclusion
of the renminbi in the SDR basket – but also, and more importantly, through making
preparations through reforms at national or regional level. 
The transition to a new regime
The transition from the status quo or the repair scenario to a more deeply transformed
IMS is likely to take a long time and to raise a number of policy issues that we could not
address in their full complexity. Instead, we focus on three speciﬁc issues. 
The ﬁrst is the pace of renminbi internationalisation. We foresee a chance for inter -
nationalisation of the Chinese currency that, towards the end of the current decade,
would bring its international weight to a level comparable to that of the British pound,
the Swiss franc or the Japanese yen. This could happen even if China keeps a relatively
closed ﬁnancial account, a moderate degree of nominal currency ﬂexibility and limited
foreign participation in its domestic ﬁnancial system. However, for the renminbi to rival
the euro and the dollar, deeper reforms will be needed to establish trust in the rule of
law, enhance China’s ability to issue high-quality assets, increase its international
engagement, make the exchange rate ﬂexible and promote ﬁnancial openness.
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The second issue is how the rebalancing of the economy can be achieved in the
absence of a major overhaul of the IMS, since both scenarios 2 and 3 are unlikely to
emerge in the next ﬁve years. Our main ﬁnding here is that the combination of (i)
demand-enhancing reforms in China and (ii) reduced willingness to accumulate oﬃcial
reserves could be a powerful driver of global rebalancing, should the Chinese
authorities be active in the implementation – this result holds whatever the exchange-
rate regime, provided capital controls are not complete. This is relatively good news
for the ‘repair-and-improve’ scenario, which monitors signiﬁcant domestic policy shifts
while reducing the incentive to accumulate oﬃcial reserves and can be powerful in
rebalancing the global economy even without a major shift in exchange-rate and capital
regimes. The difference would be that real exchange-rate adjustment would take place
through domestic inﬂation – an inferior channel by most standards. China would
beneﬁt from a ﬂexible exchange-rate regime as it would be able to control inﬂation
better. The same logic applies to US policy reforms: the effectiveness for global
rebalancing will depend more on the extent of international capital mobility than on
the partner countries’ exchange-rate regimes, although it should be remembered that
monetary policy is unable to produce any rebalancing between countries tied together
by a ﬁxed exchange rate and capital mobility.
The third issue concerns the potential for exchange-rate misalignments and asym -
metries in the run-up to scenarios 2 or 3. Here we come to three conclusions. First, as
long as China keeps a ﬁxed exchange rate vis-à-vis the dollar, developments in, and
shocks to, the Chinese economy are not neutral for the euro/dollar exchange rate,
whereas they are neutral both in a ﬂexible regime and if the renminbi is pegged to a
symmetrical basket. In other words, China’s growth and ﬁnancial development will be
less disruptive for the transatlantic exchange-rate relationship if it takes place under
a ﬂoating renminbi regime or a symmetrical peg. Second, a move from a dollar-centred
to a multi-currency system could create more short-term exchange-rate volatility, but
it would at the same time reduce the potential for medium-term exchange-rate mis -
alignments. More ﬂexibility of the renminbi exchange rate would have similar effect.
Finally, the internationalisation of the renminbi would be stabilising for the euro/dollar
exchange rate, since it would reduce the asymmetries mentioned above and would
help smooth the diversiﬁcation of oﬃcial reserves.
Implications for the euro area
From the point of view of the euro area, scenario 3 (renewed multilateralism) stands
out as both desirable and particularly congruent with the euro area’s intrinsic
principles. What is less clear is whether scenario 2 would necessarily be preferable to
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scenario 1. A major advantage would be its greater symmetry and equity. The euro-
dollar exchange rate would also be less sensitive to shocks affecting China or countries
in the Chinese sphere (though it could be more volatile in the short term). At the same
time, scenario 2 would also imply more responsibilities for the euro area. 
The real choice, however, may not end up being between scenario 1 (repair and
improve) and scenario 2 (tripolarity) but rather between tripolarity and a bipolar
scenario in which the dollar and the renminbi would form the two poles, with the euro
remaining a secondary currency. To the extent this bipolar scenario would limit the
scope for exchange-rate misalignments and adjustment asymmetries, bipolarity would
be almost as good as tripolarity as far as stability and eﬃciency are concerned.
However, the possibility of this scenario highlights the trade-off the Europeans are
facing between beneﬁtting from a share of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ (and taking
responsibility for part of the ‘exorbitant duties’) and remaining a secondary player.
This is, in essence, a political choice.
If it wants to matter in the international game, the euro area should ﬁrst and foremost
continue to address its internal diﬃculties and strengthen its internal governance. But
in order to rival the dollar, and later the renminbi, it would have to do more: streamline
its external representation; remedy its inability to supply reserve assets – which would
imply considering options for creating a new class of euro-wide bonds; and recognise
and accept the consequences of a further internationalisation of the euro for the
European Central Bank mandate. It was appropriate for the euro area to adopt in its
early years a ‘neither-encourage-nor discourage’ stance vis-à-vis the internationalisa -
tion of its currency. But whether or not to take part in the coming reshaping of monetary
relations is ultimately a political choice that cannot be left to outside players. At some
point Europeans will have to decide if they want their currency to share the privileges
of major international currencies, and if they are ready to equip themselves for the
corresponding duties. 
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